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Abstract 
An ad hoc network is a collection of wireless mobile nodes dynamically forming 
a temporary network without the use of any existing network infrastructure or 
centralized administration. There are number of routing protocols developed by 
researchers. Due to the nature of ad hoc networks, secure routing is an important area of 
research in developing secured routing protocols. Although researchers have proposed 
several secure routing protocols, their resistance towards various types of security 
attacks and efficiency are primary points of concern in implementing these protocols. 
After the evaluation of these protocols the results refer that they do not give complete 
protection against possible attacks and have some disadvantages on their performance. 
 
In this research, we examined a new routing protocol called Weight-Based Ad 
hoc On-demand Distance Vector (WBAODV) routing protocol which is efficient and 
superior of the standard Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol 
in performance, but is not secure. So we proposed a new secure routing protocol based 
on WBAODV which will be efficient and also immune against the most commonly 
possible routing attacks. Finally we analyzed the proposed protocol against many 
attacks to ensure its security and also subject it to extensive simulation tests using 
JiST/SWAN simulation tool with the most commonly well-known ad hoc performance 
metrics to ensure its efficiency. 
 
Keywords: Weight-based routing strategy, Routing attacks, Secure routing protocol, 
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A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) [1] [2] consists of a collection of wireless 
mobile nodes that are capable of communicating with each other without the use of any 
centralized administration or network infrastructure. The routing protocols in an ad hoc 
network should be able to cope well with dynamically changing topology, and nodes 
should exchange information on the topology of the network in order to establish routes. 
In general, the routing protocols of MANET can be divided into two classes: table-
driven routing protocols and on-demand routing protocols. In table-driven routing 
protocols, every node continuously maintains the complete routing information of a 
network. When a node needs to forward a packet, a route is readily available. On-
demand routing protocols are different from table-driven routing protocols in that on-
demand routing protocols only look for routes when mobile nodes need to pass on 
information. Thus, on-demand routing protocols reduce much of the load required when 
routes are sought [3] [4] [5]. Figure (1.1) shows a typical MANET topology. 
 
Figure (1.1): A typical mobile ad hoc network 
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1.1  Research Problem Statement 
Although the ongoing trend is to adopt ad hoc networks for commercial uses due 
to their certain unique properties, the main challenge is the vulnerability to security 
attacks. A number of challenges like open peer-to-peer network architecture, stringent 
resource constraints, shared wireless medium, dynamic network topology etc. are posed 
in MANET. As MANET is quickly spreading for the property of its capability in 
forming temporary network without the aid of any established infrastructure or 
centralized administration, security challenges have become a primary concern to 
provide secure communication. Network layer is more vulnerable to attacks than all 
other layers in MANET. A variety of security threats are imposed in this layer. Use of 
secure routing protocols provides the first line of defense.  So necessity of secure 
routing protocol is still a burning question. There is no general algorithm that suits well 
against the most commonly known attacks. 
1.2  Research Significance 
Like other networking sectors, providing a proper routing security in wireless 
ad-hoc networks turns out to be an important issue. Recently wireless ad-hoc networks 
become very popular due to their infrastructure-less characteristics and easy deployment 
nature. Sensitive information exchanged by the users of the devices is always 
susceptible to attack. Malicious tools running on the host device are often used to carry 
out these various attacks. So this research is very important because if we use the new 
proposed algorithm then all the attacks designed for routing protocols in MANET  will 





1.3  Research Goal 
The goal of this thesis is to propose a new secure routing protocol in MANET 
which can be called the secured version of WBAODV routing protocol. Then the new 
protocol is subjected to simulation using JiST/SWAN tool and analyzed in terms of 
security requirements of ad hoc networks and efficiency in terms of performance 
metrics. 
1.4  Research Purpose 
The secure protocol development has become the most challenging task in 
securing ad hoc networks. Most of these existing protocols have been developed based 
on specific security scenarios. In general these existing secure routing protocols are 
vulnerable to some modern possible routing attacks or have weakness in their 
performance. So the main purpose of this research is to propose a new secure routing 
protocol based on WBAODV and satisfying two primary points: immunity against all 
modern possible attacks and efficiency to ensure its superiority to the these existing 
secure routing protocols in MANET. 
1.5  Research Scope 
MANET’s Infrastructure-less topologies, communication medium and with no 
central administration presents a host of research areas like authentication, availability, 
secure routing, intrusion-detection, etc. The research approaches in MANET security 
can be categorized into four principal categories: 
• Key management models. 
• Secure routing protocols. 
• Intrusion detection systems. 
• Trust based models. 
 ٤
This thesis work focuses on secure routing protocols. The work is basically 
organized to propose a new secure routing protocol in MANET. Researchers developing 
secure routing protocols can use the result of this work as a reference. 
1.6  Target Audience 
This thesis addresses the readers having basic knowledge of networks and 
information security and who want to know about ad hoc networks and their routing 
protocols security. For researchers developing secure routing protocols this work is 
useful for further protocol development.  
1.7  Approach and Procedures 
Security has become a primary issue in order to provide protected 
communication among mobile nodes within the wireless ad-hoc network. There are 
many attacks that can target the ad-hoc routing protocol in which the malicious node 
actively interrupts the functioning of the cooperative routing mechanisms. To prevent 
threats or attacks and make secure communication, we begin our approach by studying 
these routing attacks, knowing how these attacks work and also analyzing these attacks 
against existing secure routing protocols in MANETs to find why they are vulnerable to 
these attacks.  Then there are number of security goals that should be in mind and 
achieved before designing any kind of security architecture or application. These 
security goals are confidentiality, availability, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation 
and access control.  
Then the approach is extended to thoroughly understand the issues related to 
secure a routing protocol for MANETs such as WBAODV routing protocol. A 
framework based on this understanding has to be put up to evaluate a security 
mechanism for WBAODV both in terms of functionalities and performance. This dual 
 ٥
approach emphasizes the scope and the feasibility of the evaluated security mechanism, 
two important parameters for an effective deployment. The design of a security 
mechanism has to take this framework into account in order to produce a functional 
secure network, with a well understood meaning for both ”functional” and ”secure”. 
To accomplish the previous discussed approach, this research on securing 
WBAODV routing protocol has four parts. In the first part, a general as well as a 
context-centered study is carried out to gather information and analyze it. In the second 
part, results are gathered for developing a secure routing protocol based on WBAODV. 
Third part consists of the new protocol simulation using JiST/SWAN tool, analyzing it 
against most of possible modern attacks and evaluating it with the most commonly well-
known ad hoc performance metrics. Fourth part is to write the final report and 
conclusion. 
Each of the above mentioned parts are further divided into sub modules. First 
part includes initial module. Second part has a developing module. Third part has been 
divided into: simulation module, analysis module and evaluation module. Fourth part 
consists of finishing module. Figure (1.2) shows the flow of the research methodology. 
Here is a brief of each module: 
• Initial module: information gathering familiarizes with the information related to 
the research, implement the WBAODV routing protocol and test its performance 
against AODV. 
• Developing module: depending on information gathered in initial module to 
develop and secure WBAODV. 
• Simulation module: implementing the new secure protocol using JiST/SWAN 
tool.  
 ٦
• Analysis module:  analyzing the new secure routing protocol against most 
modern possible attacks to ensure its immunity against them. 
• Evaluation module:  identifies the efficiency of the new secure routing protocol 
and compare it with MANET existing secure routing protocols. 
• Finishing module: write the results obtained from the previous modules, 





















Figure (1.2): Research Methodology 
 
1.8  Thesis Structure 
There are six chapters in this thesis. The rest of the five chapters are organized 
as follows. Chapter 2 describes the literature review and the theoretical background for 
the research. Basics concepts of AODV, WBAODV and secure routing protocols in 
MANET are included. In chapter 3 we propose our new secure routing protocol. First 
we present some preliminaries of our works. Next we discuss the assumptions, notations 
and modifications which are needed to secure WBAODV. Then our new secure routing 















secure routing protocol. First we analyze our new secure routing protocol against most 
commonly possible routing attacks in MANET. Then we also analyze six of famous 
MANET's secure routing protocols against the same routing attacks and make 
comparison between them and our new secure routing protocol to ensure its immunity 
against attacks. Chapter 5 discuses the performance analysis of our new secure routing 
protocol. First we present some information about the JiST/SWAN simulation tool 
which we used to build our new secure routing protocol. Next we describe our 
simulation model and parameters. Then we subject our new secure routing protocol and 
two of famous secure routing protocols in MANET to extensive simulations with the 
most commonly well-known ad hoc performance metrics to ensure our new secure 
routing protocol's efficiency. Finally, in chapter 6, conclusions and suggestions for 
















Theoretical Background and Literature Review  
 
2.1  Literature Review 
In the literature there are many papers that try to enhance the performance of 
AODV routing protocol or to secure it against some specific attacks. The papers that 
enhance AODV performance are such that: In 2005 V.Sumathy, P. Narayanasamy, 
J.James and S.Kanimozhi have proposed a Throughput Maximization Routing (TMR) 
to predict the link breakage time and send a warning message to the source node of the 
packet and reduce the packet loss due to less energy in the node and packet loss is also 
reduced by providing multiple alternate routes to deliver data packets [6]. In 2005 
Zheng Kai, Wang Neng and Liu Ai-fang proposed a AODV-based clustering routing 
protocol (called AODV-clustering) which can effectively solve scalability problem and 
also keep the merits of AODV [7]. In 2007 Nen-Chung Wang, Yung-Fa Huang and Jhu-
Chan Chen proposed a Stable Weight-based On-demand Routing Protocol (SWORP) 
for MANETs. The proposed scheme uses the weight-based route strategy to select a 
stable route in order to enhance system performance. The weight of a route is decided 
by three factors: the route expiration time, the error count, and the hop count. Route 
discovery usually first finds multiple routes from the source node to the destination 
node. Then the path with the largest weight value for routing is selected [8]. In 2008 
Khamforoosh, Rahmani and Sheikh Ahmadi presented a new plan in multiple paths on-
demand distance vector (AODV) routing who is based on the distance of nodes from the 
center of the network. In this new routing algorithm, the number of dropped packets 
will be decreased and indeed this will happen with more balancing in the network [9]. 
 ٩
In 2009 Shayesteh Tabatabaei and Mohammad Ali Jabraeil Jamali provided a 
centralized algorithm for routing in Ad hoc networks which they called Weight-Based 
AODV (WBAODV) routing protocol. Simulation results show that the WBAODV 
algorithm improves the throughput and delay significantly and also improves the 
network performance [10]. 
The papers that try to secure AODV against some specified attacks are such that: 
In 2001 Manel Guerrero Zapata proposed the secure version of AODV routing protocol 
which called "Secure Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (SAODV) Routing protocol” 
but this protocol is vulnerable to some possible attacks such that denial of service 
attack, tunneling attack and wormhole attack [11]. In 2005 Liu Jun, Li Zhe, Lin Dan and 
Liu Ye analyzed the potential insecurity factors in the AODV protocol and proposed a 
security routing protocol based on the credence model is which can react quickly when 
some malicious behaviors in the network are detected and effectively protects the 
network from some kinds of attacks and guarantees the security of ad hoc networks 
[12]. In 2007 Djamel Djenouri, Othmane Mahmoudi, Mohamed Bouamama, David 
Llewellyn-Jones and Madjid Merabti deal with securing routing protocols of mobile ad 
hoc networks (MANETs) against packet dropping misbehavior. More specifically, they 
proposed a solution to protect control packets of reactive source routing protocols 
against [13]. In 2009 N.Bhalaj and A.Shanmugam analyzed the blackhole attack which 
is one of the possible and commonest attacks in ad hoc networks. In their approach they 
classify nodes in to three categories based on their behavior. The extents of association 
between the nodes are used for the route selection [14]. In 2009 Mohammed Ibrahim, 
Nayera Sadek and Mohamed El-Banna addressed the flooding attack by applying 
multiple nodes in a simulated environment. They proposed a Real-time Host Intrusion 
Detection for Ad hoc Networks (REHIDAN) algorithm to identify the flooding attacker 
 ١٠
nodes. It also takes the appropriate countermeasures to minimize the effectiveness of the 
attack and maintain the network performance within the accepted limits [15]. 
2.2  AODV Routing Protocol Overview 
The Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector protocol (AODV) is a reactive 
protocol designed for ad hoc networks [16]. AODV offers low overhead, quick 
adaptation to dynamic link conditions and low processing and memory overhead. 
AODV uses a broadcast route discovery mechanism, and it relies on dynamically 
established routing table entries at intermediate nodes. The functions performed by 
AODV protocol include local connectivity management, route discovery, route table 
management and path maintenance. Local connectivity management may be 
summarized as follows. Nodes learn about their neighbors by either receiving or 
sending broadcast packets from or to their neighbors. Receiving the broadcast or 
HELLO packet from a new neighbor or failing to receive HELLO packet from a node 
that was previously in the neighborhood, indicates that the local connectivity has 
changed. 
The source node initiates path discovery by broadcasting a Route Request 
(RREQ) packet to its neighbors. When a node receives a RREQ, in case it has routing 
information, it sends the Route Reply packet (RREP) back to the destination. Otherwise, 
it rebroadcasts the RREQ packet further to its neighbors. As the RREQ packet travels 
from the source to the destination it automatically sets up the reverse path for all nodes 
back to the source. As the RREP travels back to the source, each node along the path 
sets up a forward pointer to the node from which the RREP came and updates its 
timeout information for route entries to the source and the destination. 
Each node maintains a monotonically increasing sequence number, which serves 
as a logical time at that node. Also, every route entry includes a destination sequence 
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number, which indicates the “time” at the destination node when the route was created. 
The protocol uses sequence numbers to ensure that nodes only update routes with 
“newer” ones. Doing so, we also ensure loop- freedom for all routes to a destination. 
All RREQ messages include the originator’s sequence number, and its (latest 
known) destination sequence number. Nodes receiving the RREQ add or update routes 
to the originator with the originator sequence number, assuming this new number is 
greater than that of any existing entry. If the node receives an identical RREQ message 
via another path, the originator sequence numbers would be the same, so in this case, 
the node would pick the route with the smaller hop count (the shortest path). 
If a node receiving the RREQ message has a route to the desired destination, 
then we use sequence numbers to determine whether this route is “fresh enough” to use 
as a reply to the route request. To do this, we check if this node’s destination sequence 
number is at least as great as the maximum destination sequence number of all nodes 
through which the RREQ message has passed. If this is the case, then we can roughly 
guess that this route is not terribly out-of-date, and we send a RREP back to the 
originator. 
As with RREQ messages, RREP messages also include destination sequence 
numbers. There are so nodes along the route path can update their routing table entries 
with the latest destination sequence number. 
Path maintenance is performed in several ways. When any node along an 
established path moves, so that some of the nodes become unreachable, a Route Error 
packet (RERR) packet is sent to affected source nodes. Whenever a Node receives 
RERR it looks at the Routing Table and removes all the routes that contain the bad 
Nodes. Upon receiving notification indicating a broken link, the source node restarts the 
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path discovery process, if it still needs that route [17]. Figure (2.1) shows flow chart that 
summarizes the action of an AODV node when processing an incoming message. 
HELLO messages are excluded from the diagram for brevity. 
 
 
Figure (2.1): AODV Processes Flow Chart 
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2.3  WBAODV Routing Protocol Overview 
There are two main issues in ad hoc wireless networks. The first is the Quality 
of Service (QoS) problem. Quality of service is very important since multimedia 
services become popular. Over the past few years a considerable number of studies have 
been made on this aspect. The other issue is the mobility problem. In MANETs, 
whichever routing protocols are aimed at how to find a shortest path. Due to the host’s 
mobility in ad hoc network, a shortest path isn’t necessarily the better path. If you don’t 
consider the stability of routing path, then wireless links is easy to be broken. Many 
researches have been done how to enhance the networks stability. (For example, 
stability aware cluster routing protocol for mobile ad hoc network [18], the stable paths 
problem and interdomain routing [19], a reliable route selection algorithm using global 
position systems in mobile ad hoc networks [20]). Therefore, to enhance the networks 
stability a Weight-based AODV routing protocol (WBAODV)) is proposed to achieve 
this objective [10]. The proposed scheme uses the weight-based route strategy to select 
the most stable route (the route with the largest weighted value) for data transmission in 
order to enhance system throughput and performance. 
 WBAODV improves routing quality in MANETs by using the information 
available in the network. This idea desires for choosing a stable path for decreasing 
overhead for path finding, decreasing number of hops for presenting in path finding and 
optimized use of powerful and energetic paths [10]. There are several important 
parameters [10] [21] [22]: 
1-Hop count (HC): this parameter as the distance (in hops) between the routers 
otherwise the HC is the number of hops for a feasible path. The smaller the HC is, the 
more reliable the routing path.  The destination node D knows the HC value of the 
feasible paths via the hop count in the RREQ packet. As shown in figure (2.2) for Path I 
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(S, A, K, H, D), HC1 = 4. For Path II (S, B, E, D), HC2 = 3. For Path III (S, C, F, G, D), 
HC3 = 4. 
 
Figure (2.2): Hop count of each feasible path 
 
2-Bandwidth metric (BW): this parameter shows, accounts necessary bandwidth for 
sending a file. To measure the bandwidth for a (i, j) link. This link has an available 
bandwidth according to following equation: 
B_available (i, j) = (1-u)*Bandwidth (i, j) 
Where u is the link utilization (i.e. u = A (t)/t, A (t) is the total amount of time where the 
link is used by nodes during an interval of time t). 
3-Power of battery (PB): With using the parameter, account necessary energy for 
completely sending a file or data before transforming data packages with considering 
the size of packages. 
4-Speed (SP): this parameter shows rate of mobility for mobiles. 
5-Max Hop count (MHC): is the maximum Hop count for all feasible paths. 
6-Max Power of battery (MPB): is the maximum Power level of battery for mobile. 
7-Max Bandwidth (MBW): this parameter shows, accounts maximum available 
bandwidth between two adjacent nodes. 
The reliability of a feasible path is based upon four factors: the mobility of 
nodes, the power level of battery, the Bandwidth and the hop count. WBAODV 
 ١٥
effectively combines all the four parameters with weighing factors F1, F2, F3 and F4, 
the values of which can be chosen according to the system requirements. For example, 
the power level of battery is very important in MANET. Thus, the weight of that factor 
can be made +1. The flexibility of changing the factors helps in using WBAODV to 
select a routing path. A larger route expiration time represents higher reliability, as do a 
lower error count and lower hop count [10]. 
The weight function in [10] is defined as an empirical mean value, where they 
first normalize each item and then combine these four quantities. More precisely, 
W i = F1 * (SP) + F2 * (PB/MPB) + F3 * (HC/MHC) + F4 * (BW/MBW) 
Where |F1| * |F2| *|F3| * |F4| =1. For example assume that F1 = -1, F2 = +1, F3 = -1, 
and F4 =+1.  
WBAODV Selects the route with the largest weight value among all feasible 
route paths to be the main routing path. Also path finding, table structure and path 
maintenance processes in WBAODV are like the AODV routing protocol. Figure (2.3) 









Step 1: When the source S receives a packet from the transport layer in direction of 
destination D, it checks if a route exists to the destination.  
- If it already has a route, it transmits the packet to the next hop node.  
- Else, it transmits a RREQ request. 
Step 2: When a node X receives a RREQ request with a source S, a destination D 
and a source-sequence-number (sqn1) then: 
X calculates the weight (Wi) with the weight function. 
Step 3:  If the pair < S, D> exists in the reverse route entry table for node X with a 
weight (W1 ) and a source- sequence-number denoted (sqn2) then: 
- If (Wi > W1 and sqn1=sqn2) or (sqn1 > sqn2) then: 
 X updates this reverse route entry table 
• If (X # D) 
X broadcasts the RREQ request up to date 
• Else 
X sends a RREP request 
-Else 















Figure (2.3): WBAODV routing protocol pseudo code 
According to the results in [23], WBAODV outperforms Dynamic Source 
Routing (DSR) and AODV routing protocols in performance especially in the high 
mobility environment. 
2.4  MANET Secure Routing Protocols and SAODV Security 
Mechanism 
In Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET) much of the research has been done 
focusing on the efficiency of the network. There are quite a number of routing protocols 
that are excellent in terms of efficiency. But the security requirements of these protocols 
changed the situation and a more detailed research is currently underway to develop 
Step 4:  
-If the condition in step 3 doesn't satisfied then: 
Go to step 5. 
- Else go to step 6.  
Step 5: X creates a new pair < S, D > in its reverse route entry table with the 
weight equal to Wi and a source-sequence-number equal to sqn1 
-If (X = D) 
X sends a RREP request 
- Else 
X broadcasts the RREQ request up to date 
Step 6: When a node X receives a RREP request from node Y with a source S, a 
destination D, a weight W1, and a source-sequence-number sqn1 then: 
Go to step 7. 
Step 7: If the pair < S, D > exists in the routing table for node X with a weight 
W2 and a source-sequence-number denoted sqn2 then: 
-If (W1 > W2 and sqn1=sqn2) or (sqn1 > sqn2) 
X updates the routing table with the next hop Y 
• If (X # S) 
X forwards the RREP to the previous node 
-Else 
X discards the RREP  
Step 8: 
-If the condition in step 7 doesn't satisfied then: 
X creates a new tuple in its routing table with the next hop Y 
•If (X # S) 
X forwards the RREP to the previous node 
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secure ad hoc routing protocols [24] [25]. MANETs are extremely vulnerable to attacks 
[26] [27] [28] due to their dynamically changing topology, absence of conventional 
security infrastructures and open medium of communication, which, unlike their wired 
counterparts, cannot be secured. To address these concerns, several secure routing 
protocols have been proposed: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing (SEAD) [29], 
Ariadne [53], Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) [47], Secure Ad 
hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing (SAODV) [11], Secure Routing Protocol 
(SRP), and Security- Aware Routing Protocol (SAR). Although researchers have 
proposed several secure routing protocols, their resistance towards various types of 
security attacks and efficiency are primary points of concern in implementing these 
protocols. After the evaluation of these protocols in [30] the results refer to that they do 
not give complete protection against possible attacks or have some disadvantages on 
their performance. Hence, there is a need for developing a new secure routing protocol 
with efficient performance. 
In an ad hoc network, from the point of view of a routing protocol, there are two 
kinds of messages: the routing messages and the data messages. Both have a different 
nature and different security needs. Data messages are point-to-point and can be 
protected with any point-to-point security system (like IPSec). On the other hand, 
routing messages are sent to immediate neighbors, processed, possibly modified, and 
resent.  
Another consequence of the nature of the transmission of routing messages is 
that, in many cases, there will be some parts of those messages that will change during 
their propagation. This is very common in Distance-Vector routing protocols, where the 
routing messages usually contain a hop count of the route they are requesting or 
providing. Therefore, in a routing message one could distinguish between two types of 
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information: mutable and non-mutable. It is desired that the mutable information in a 
routing message is secured in such a way that no trust in intermediate nodes is needed. 
Otherwise, securing the mutable information will be much more expensive in 
computation, plus the overall security of the system will greatly decrease. Moreover, as 
a result of the processing of the routing message, a node might modify its routing table. 
This creates the need for the intermediate nodes to be able to authenticate the 
information contained in the routing messages (a need that does not exist in point-to-
point communications). 
SAODV addresses the problem of securing a MANET network. SAODV is an 
extension of the AODV routing protocol that can be used to protect the route discovery 
mechanism providing security features like integrity, authentication and non-
repudiation. 
SAODV assumes that each ad hoc node has a signature key pair from a suitable 
asymmetric cryptosystem. Further, each ad hoc node is capable of securely verifying the 
association between the address of a given ad hoc node and the public key of that node. 
Achieving this is the job of the Simple Ad hoc Key Management (SAKM) which is a 
key management system that allows the nodes of an ad hoc network to use asymmetric 
cryptography with zero configurations [31]. Two mechanisms are used in SAODV to 
secure the routing messages: 
1-Digital signatures: to authenticate the non-mutable fields of the messages. They also 
provide an end-to-end authentication and node-to-node verification of these messages. 
The underlined process is relatively simple. The source node digitally signs the route 
request packet (RREQ) and broadcasts it to its neighbors. When an intermediate node 
receives a RREQ message, it first verifies the signature before creating or updating a 
reverse route to its predecessor. It then stores or updates the route only if the signature is 
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verified. A similar procedure is followed for the route reply packet (RREP). As an 
optimization, intermediate nodes can reply with RREP messages, if they have a “fresh 
enough” route to the destination. Since the intermediate node will have to digitally sign 
the RREP message as if it came from the destination, it uses the double signature 
extension described in this protocol. There are many digital signature methods available 
like: RSA, DSA and ElGamal [31]. 
 2- Hash chains: to secure the hop count information (the only mutable information in 
the messages). This is because for the non-mutable information, authentication can be 
performed in a point-to-point manner, but the same kind of techniques cannot be 
applied to the mutable information. During the route discovery process, the source node 
first selects a random seed number and sets the Maximum Hop-count (MHC) value. By 
using a hash function h, the source computes the hash value as h (seed) and Top_Hash 
as h
MHC
 (seed). When an intermediate node receives an RREQ message, it checks 
whether the value of Top_Hash is equal to h
MHC-Hop_Count
 (Hash). If so, it will assume 
that the hop count has not been altered. Before rebroadcasting the RREQ to the 
neighboring nodes, the intermediate node will increment the hop-count field by one in 
the RREQ header and also compute the new Hash value by hashing the old value (i.e., 
h(Hash)). Except for the hop-count field and h
hop_count
 (seed), all other fields of the 
RREQ are non-mutable and therefore can be authenticated by verifying the signature in 
the RREQ. When the destination node receives an RREQ, it generates an RREP in the 
same way. SAODV can also allow an intermediate node to generate an RREP by using 
double signature extension. There are many hash functions are available like: MD2, 
MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 [32]. 
Route error messages are protected in a different manner because they have a 
big amount of mutable information. In addition, it is not relevant which node started the 
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route error and which nodes are just forwarding it. The only relevant information is that 
a neighbor node is informing another node that it is not going to be able to route 
messages to certain destinations anymore. Therefore, every node (generating or 
forwarding a route error message) uses digital signatures to sign the whole message and 
that any neighbor that receives verifies the signature [31]. 
2.5  Control Packets Dropping Prevention Scheme 
In this section we present securing routing protocols of mobile ad hoc networks 
(MANETs) against packet dropping misbehavior. More specifically, we overview a 
solution to protect control packets of reactive routing protocols against. Most current 
proposals focus on data packets. Nonetheless, dropping control packets may be 
beneficial for selfish nodes and malicious ones as well. For example, simply by 
dropping RREQ packets a selfish node could exclude itself from routes and thereby 
avoid receiving data packets to forward. Similarly, a malicious node could drop RERR 
packets to keep the use of failed routes, potentially resulting in a denial of service. In 
the following we give some details of the solution in [13] to monitor the forwarding of 
control packets, judge the monitored nodes, and isolate the detected misbehaving nodes. 
2.5.1  Monitoring Directed Packets 
The approach suggests to use to monitor the forwarding of directed routing 
control packets (RREP, RERR) needs to be implemented with a source routing protocol. 
Each node A monitors its successor B in the route and checks whether this latter 
forwards to C each packet it provides, such that C is B’s successor in the route and A 
could be either the source or any intermediate node. This process is repeated on each 
couple of hops until reaching the final destination. The solution uses a special kind of 
feedbacks called two-hop ACK that travels two hops [33]. Node C acknowledges 
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packets sent from A by sending this latter via B a two-hop ACK. To ensure 
authentication of two-hop ACK packets an asymmetric cryptography-based strategy is 
used. Node A generates a random number and encrypts it with C’s public key (PK), and 
then appends it in the packet’s header. When C receives the packet it retrieves the 
number, decrypts it using its secret key (SK), encrypts it using A’s PK, and puts it in a 
two-hop ACK it sends back to A via B. When A receives the ACK it decrypts the 
random number and checks whether it matches with the one it has generated, in order to 
validate B’s forwarding regarding the appropriate packet. However, if B does not 
forward the packet A will not receive the two-hop ACK, and it will be able to detect this 
dropping after a timeout. This strategy requires a key distribution mechanism enabling a 
security association between each pair of nodes. Note that the same keys could be 
employed for other security purposes at the other layers. As soon as the monitor node 
detects that the number of packets dropped by the monitored node exceeds a defined 
threshold, it considers this latter as misbehaving and proceeds to its isolation. Note that 
dropping RREPs (respectively RREQs) prevents a selfish node from being included in 
routes, while dropping RERRs allows a malicious node to launch a denial of service 
attack by preventing the destruction of broken routes. Also, note that the overhead is not 
an important issue for this kind of packets, since their number is low [13]. 
2.5.2  Monitoring Broadcast Packets 
For RREQs packets (which are broadcast), each node monitors every RREQ it 
forwards or launches as a source. The monitoring starts from the reception of the RREQ 
(or its launch if the node is the source) and ends after a timeout from its retransmission. 
For each RREQ, the transmitter monitors all its neighbors. It should either receive (or 
overhear) the RREQ or a RREP from every neighbor, except the node from which it 
received the RREQ if the node is not the source. If no one of these packets is received 
 ٢٢
from a neighbor B, then the monitor notices a packet dropping for B. When a node 
observes that another node B drops more than the configured threshold number of 
packets it judges B as misbehaving, and tries to isolate it as we will see later [13]. 
2.5.3  Redemption  
To get over false detections that may occur due to nodes mobility and channel 
conditions, they present a redemption strategy for both kinds of packets. The aim is to 
allow a well-behaving node improving its reputation and tolerance threshold after it has 
been observed to drop packets due to mobility or collisions. This can be achieved by 
decreasing the number of packets considered dropped each time it is perceived to 
correctly forward packets. The pace of decreasing is not inevitably 1, but should be < 1 
to prevent nodes from abusing this redemption. That is, forwarding one packet does not 
decrease the number of packets considered dropped by one. If the pace is m/n (such that 
m,n ε N,m < n), then forwarding n packets decreases the number by m [13].  
2.5.4  Isolation  
After judging a node as misbehaving, the detector attempts to isolate it. Isolating 
a misbehaving node means: do not route packets through it, to avoid losing them, and 
do not forward packets for it, to punish it. A node A that judges some other node B as 
misbehaving should not punish it unilaterally, but must ensure that this will be done by 
all nodes. This is because when A unilaterally punishes B; the others could consider A 
as misbehaving when they realize that it does not forward packets for B. In social life, a 
person that accuses another must show proof. One possible way to prove the accusation 
is to get witnesses against the accused person. Similarly, to isolate a detected node they 
present the use of a testimony-based protocol [34], already used with data packets. 
Upon a detection, the detector informs nodes in its neighborhood about the dropper (the 
accused), and asks for witnesses by broadcasting a WREQ (Witness REQuest) packet. It 
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also puts the detected node ID in a special set we call a suspicious set. Each node 
receiving the WREQ investigates the issue as follows: 
For directed packets: The receiver of WREQ immediately sends a signed WREP 
(Witness REPly) packet to the accuser if its suspicious set includes the accused node 
(denoted by B). Otherwise, if it has not enough experience with the accused node, and if 
B is its neighbor then it asks the successor of this latter whether it has received packets 
forwarded from it, by sending an ACREQ (ACcusation REQuest) packet, using a route 
that does not include B. But first, in order to avoid false accusations, the investigator 
should ensure that the accuser has really sent a packet to B to be forwarded to the 
appropriate successor. One possible way to do this is to check whether such a packet 
has been recently overheard, using the promiscuous mode. The node also should check 
whether B has sent the accuser an ACK just after overhearing the data, to ensure that the 
former has really received the packet and that the latter does not impress it. If B’s 
successor has not recently received any packet forwarded from B, it sends a signed 
ACREP (ACcusation REPly) packet to the investigator, then this latter testifies for the 
accusation and sends the accuser a signed WREP (Witness REPly) packet [13].  
For broadcast packets: In this case the node, if it is a neighbor of B, merely checks 
whether it has recently received (respectively overheard) either any RREQ forwarded 
from this node, or a RREP originated from it. To do this, each node keeps the RREQs 
and RREPs it receives in a buffer for a short time. If neither RREQ nor RREP have 
been received then it testifies for the accusation and sends the accuser a signed WREP 
(Witness REPly) packet. But it must first ensure that the accuser node has really 
recently sent out a RREQ, by checking in its buffer [13]. 
When the detector collects k validation from its neighbors, with at least one 
provided by direct experience (without asking the successor of B), it broadcasts in the 
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network an accusation packet (AC) containing signatures of all the validating nodes. 
The requirement of at least one direct witness aims at mitigating wrong accusations 
caused by false testimonies. Each node receiving such a valid accusation isolates the 
guilty. Otherwise, if the detector fails to collect k validation then it does not punish the 
detected node, but keeps it in the suspicious set and could avoid sending its own packets 
through it [13]. 
2.6  Flooding Attack Prevention Scheme 
In this section, we present the Ad Hoc Flooding Attack, which results in denial 
of service when used against all on-demand ad hoc networks routing protocols. In this 
attack, the attacker either broadcasts a lot of Route Request packets for node ID who is 
not in networks so as to congest in links. To defend routing protocols against the Ad 
Hoc Flooding attack, we present a generic secure component, called Flooding Attack 
Prevention (FAP), which is a set of generic mechanisms that together defend against the 
Ad Hoc Flooding Attack. The method of neighbor suppression is used to prevent RREQ 
Flooding Attack. Mobile ad hoc networks are multi-hop wireless networks, and the 
node sends and receives packets through its neighbor nodes. If all neighbor nodes 
around the node refuse to forward its packets, the node can not communicate with the 
other nodes in mobile ad hoc networks. The node has been isolated from the network in 
practice even if it is still in the networks in location [35]. Figure (2.4) shows a topology 
of mobile ad hoc network. The node H communicates with the other nodes through 
node D, F, G and I. If the neighbor nodes D, F, G and I refuse to receive packets from 




Figure (2.4): Neighbor nodes isolate the flooding attacker (node H). 
 
The main idea of neighbor suppression is that each neighbor calculates the rate 
of RREQ originated by intruder. If the rate exceeds some threshold, all neighbors will 
not receive and forward packets from intruder. They define two tables in every node: 
Rate_RREQ and Flooding_Blacklist. The table of Rate_RREQ records the rate of 
RREQ which every neighbor node originates, and does not record times of forwarded 
RREQ. The Rate_RREQ has two columns: Node_ID and RREQ_time. Node_ID 
includes all neighbor nodes ID. RREQ_time records times which neighbor node 
originates RREQ [35].  The process is Algorithm 1 as shown in figure (2.5). 
 
Figure (2.5): FAP Algorithm 1. 
To calculate the rate of RREQ and find the intruder, Algorithm 2 is run one time 
every second [35] as shown in figure (2.6). 
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Figure (2.6): FAP Algorithm 2. 
Because RREQ_time sets up 0 every second, it can stand for rate which every 
neighbor node originates. If the time exceeds the threshold, we may make a judge that it 
is intruder. When node receives a packet, node firstly looks up source ID of packet. If 
source ID is in Blacklist, node directly discards the packet. If source ID is not in 
Blacklist, node disposes the packet by normal process. The threshold is the maximum of 
originating RREQ in a period time, such as 1 second. If the frequency of originating 
RREQ of the attacker exceeds the threshold, the node will not receive the RREQ from 
the attacker any more [35]. To clarify, we take node H and its neighbor node D, I, F, G 
for example in figure (2.4). If the frequency which node H originates RREQ exceeds the 
threshold, node F will deny the RREQ packets from node H. similarly, node D, I, G will 
deny the RREQ packets form node H. As a result, the Ad Hoc Flooding Attack from 
node H is prevented by its neighbor nodes. 
2.7  Wormhole Attack Prevention using Temporal Leash 
In this section, we introduce the wormhole attack, a severe attack in ad hoc 
networks that is particularly challenging to defend against. The wormhole attack is 
possible even if the attacker has not compromised any hosts and even if all 
communication provides authenticity and confidentiality. In the wormhole attack, an 
attacker records packets (or bits) at one location in the network, tunnels them (possibly 
selectively) to another location, and retransmits them there into the network. The 
wormhole attack can form a serious threat in wireless networks, especially against many 
ad hoc network routing protocols and location-based wireless security systems. For 
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example, most existing ad hoc network routing protocols, without some mechanism to 
defend against the wormhole attack, would be unable to find routes longer than one or 
two hops, severely disrupting communication. 
The notion of a packet leash is considered as a general mechanism for detecting 
and thus defending against wormhole attacks. A leash is any information that is added 
to a packet designed to restrict the packet’s maximum allowed transmission distance. 
There are two types of packet leashes: geographical leashes and temporal leashes. A 
geographical leash ensures that the recipient of the packet is within a certain distance 
from the sender. A temporal leash ensures that the packet has an upper bound on its 
lifetime, which restricts the maximum travel distance, since the packet can travel at 
most at the speed of light. Either type of leash can prevent the wormhole attack, because 
it allows the receiver of a packet to detect if the packet traveled further than the leash 
allows [36]. 
To construct a temporal leash, in general, all nodes must have tightly 
synchronized clocks, such that maximum difference between any two nodes’ clocks is 
δ. The value of the parameter δ must be known by all nodes in the network, and for 
temporal leashes, generally must be on the order of a few microseconds or even 
hundreds of nanoseconds. Although the general requirement for time synchronization is 
indeed a restriction on the applicability of temporal leashes, for applications that require 
defense against the wormhole attack, this requirement is justified due to the seriousness 
of the attack and its potential disruption of the intended functioning of the network [36]. 
To use temporal leashes, when sending a packet, the sending node includes in 
the packet the time at which it sent the packet, ts; when receiving a packet, the receiving 
node compares this value to the time at which it received the packet, tr. The receiver is 
thus able to detect if the packet traveled too far, based on the claimed transmission time 
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and the speed of light. Alternatively, a temporal leash can be constructed by instead 
including in the packet an expiration time, after which the receiver should not accept the 
packet; based on the allowed maximum transmission distance and the speed of light, the 
sender sets this expiration time in the packet as an offset from the time at which it sends 
the packet. The expiration time can be expressed as: 
te= ts + L / c - ∆ 
Where te: packet expiration time, ts: packet sent time, c: propagation speed of wireless 
signal, L: maximum allowed travel distance; L > Lmin = ∆*c and ∆: maximum clock 
difference between two nodes. As with a geographical leash, a regular digital signature 
scheme or other authentication technique can be used to allow a receiver to authenticate 











Secure Weight-Based Ad hoc On-demand 
Distance Vector (SWBAODV) Routing Protocol  
In this chapter we propose our new secure routing protocol which we called 
SWBAODV. It is based on WBAODV [10] and uses the same stable weight-based 
routing strategy. We secure WBAODV by adding to it some security primitives and 
mechanisms to enhance the immunity against various attacks. In chapter 2 we 
introduced general security solutions and mechanisms which are proposed to protect 
MANET routing protocols against certain attacks, but to apply these general solutions to 
WBAODV we need some assumptions and modifications to it. After doing the required 
assumptions and modifications, SWBAODV is obtained.  
3.1  Assumptions, Notations and Modifications to WBAODV 
In this sub section we mention the needed assumptions and modifications that 
are used in SWBAODV: 
1. As SAODV the SWBAODV will use the asymmetric cryptography concepts, so 
each node in the network will have two keys: one private (secret) and another is 
public. 
2. As SAODV there will be Simple Ad hoc Key Management (SAKM) which is a 
trusted key management system that allows the nodes of an ad hoc network to 
use asymmetric cryptography with zero configurations. Each ad hoc node is 
capable of securely verifying the association between the address of a given ad 
hoc node and the public key of that node through SKAM, so it will be always 
available. 
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3. SWBAODV will secure the routing messages only. 
4. In RREQ packet the SWBAODV will set the D flag (Destination only flag) by 1 
in the RREQ packet header to indicate that only the destination will respond to 
this RREQ. The objective of this step is to meet with stable weight-based 
routing strategy that states that the intermediate nodes shouldn't respond to 
RREQ even if they already know the fresh route to the destination in their 
routing table. Instead they are forced to forward the RREQ to let it arrives to the 
destination that will enable it to compute the weights of the complete paths and 
select the one with maximum weight. Also another benefit of this step is to 
reduce the processing overhead because the intermediate nodes will not use the 
double signatures which consumes high amount of power and take a long time to 
complete which at the end will enhance the performance. Figure (3.1) shows the 
standard AODV RREQ message format.  
             0                                  1                                  2                                  3 
                   0  1 2 3  4  5 6  7  8 9  0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7 8  9  0 1  2 3  4  5  6 7 8  9  0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
           +              Type      |J|R|G|D|U|              Reserved          |   Hop Count       + 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
                 +                                                 RREQ ID                                                + 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
           +                                           Destination IP Address                                 + 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
                 +                                 Destination Sequence Number                               + 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
                 +                                         Originator IP Address                                     + 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
                 +                                  Originator Sequence Number                                + 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
Figure (3.1): AODV Route Request (RREQ) message format 
5. SWBAODV will use digital signatures with timestamps by using one of the 
available digital signature methods to authenticate the non-mutable fields of the 
routing messages, providing an end-to-end authentication, node-to-node 
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verification of routing messages, message integrity, message validation and as a 
part of temporal leash concept which is described in section 2.7. 
 
6. SWBAODV will use hash chains to secure the hop count information (the only 
mutable information in the RREQ message) by using one of the available hash 
functions. 
7. SWBAODV will sign the whole REER and HELLO massages without using 
hash chains. 
8. When the destination node receives the first RREQ packet, it will wait for a 
certain time to enable itself to receive other possible RREQ packets from other 
possible feasible paths. Then the destination node will compute the weight for 
each feasible path using the weight function which described in section 2.3. 
Afterwards the destination node will select the path with the maximum weight 
value as the main data transmission routing path among all feasible paths. 
Finally the destination node will send a RREP packet to the source node along 
the main routing path. 
9. We add a new field to RREQ packet which we called Precursor_Id to contain 
the previous node’s IP address for the node that forwarded the RREQ packet. 
For example in figure (3.2): when node B receive the RREQ packet from node 
A, it will read the IP address of the previous node of A from the Precursor_Id 
field in the RREQ packet and store it in special table. Then node B will put the 
IP address for node A in this field and forward the RREQ packet to C. Similarly 
node C will save the IP address of A in the special table and put the IP address 
of B in the Precursor_Id field and forward the RREQ packet to its neighbors 
and so on. Figure (3.3) shows the SWBAODV RREQ message format. 
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Figure (3.2): Forwarding RREQ packet in SWBAODV 
 
             0                                  1                                  2                                  3 
                   0  1 2 3  4  5 6  7  8 9  0 1 2  3  4  5  6 7 8  9  0 1  2 3  4  5  6 7 8  9  0 1 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
           +              Type      |J|R|G|D|U|              Reserved          |   Hop Count       + 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
                 +                                                 RREQ ID                                                + 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
           +                                           Destination IP Address                                 + 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
                 +                                 Destination Sequence Number                               + 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
                 +                                         Originator IP Address                                     + 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
                 +                                  Originator Sequence Number                                + 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
                 +                                              Precursor_Id                                              + 
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
Figure (3.3): SWBAODV Route Request (RREQ) message format 
 
10. Every node in the network will create a new table which we called 
Monitoring_Table that has four columns. These columns are SID: Source's IP 
address for the RREQ, DID: Destination's IP address for the RREQ, 
PRE_NODE_ID: the Precursor node's IP address which forwarded this RREQ, 
PREV_PRE_NODE_ID: the Previous node's IP address for the Precursor node 
that forwarded this RREQ. When a node receives a RREQ packet it adds or 
updates the entry for the pair <Source, Destination> in its Monitoring_Table. 
This for purposes of control packet dropping prevention scheme which is 
described in section 2.5. Every node will use this table to keep track of its 
successor nodes to monitor them when forwarded RREP or RERR packets to 
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them. Figure (3.4) shows the node C’s Monitoring_Table entry for the RREQ 
packet in figure (3.2). 
 
Figure (3.4): Node C’s Monitoring_Table entry   
 
11. When the source node originates the RREQ packet, it leaves the Precursor_Id 
field empty because no node is previous of it and when its neighbor receive this 
RREQ, they leave PREV_NODE_ID column empty in their Monitoring_Table 
because no need to monitor the source node which is the final node that will 
receive the RREP or REER packets. Then source's neighbors put the source's IP 
address in the Precursor_Id field of the RREQ and broadcast it to their 
neighbors. Then the process continues normally as illustrated in control packets 
dropping prevention scheme and steps 9 and 10.  
12. The monitoring process doesn't include Hello packets because every node only 
sends or receives Hello packets to or from its neighbors. 
13. Every node in the network will create a new list which we called Suspicious_List 
that will contain all suspicious nodes that drop control packets for the node that 
create this list. This list will be used in control packet dropping prevention 
scheme which is described in section 2.5. 
14. SWBAODV will use some special packets like: Two-hop ACK, WREQ (witness 
request), WREP (witness reply), ACREQ (accusation request), ACREP 
(accusation reply) and AC (accusation packet). These packets are used as part of 
the control packet dropping prevention scheme which is described in section 2.5. 
15. Every node will create two new tables: Rate_RREQ and Flooding_Blacklist. The 
table of Rate_RREQ records the rate of RREQ which every neighbor node 
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originates, and does not record times of forwarded RREQ. The Rate_RREQ has 
two columns: Node_ID and RREQ_time. Node_ID includes all neighbor nodes 
ID. RREQ_time records times which neighbor node originates RREQ. 
Flooding_Blacklist will contain all nodes that try to flood the network with 
RREQ packets and detected by the node that create this table. These new tables 
will be used in flooding attack prevention scheme described in section 2.6 
16. SWBAODV will use temporal leash concept which is described in section 2.7 to 
prevent wormhole and tunneling attacks. 
17. In temporal leash maximum clock error (∆) must be known by all nodes in the 
network and be on the order of microseconds or hundreds of nanoseconds. 
3.2  SWBAODV Routing Algorithm 
The functions performed by SWBAODV protocol include local connectivity 
management, route discovery, route table management and path maintenance. 
3.2.1  Local Connectivity Management Process 
It may be summarized as follows. Nodes learn about their neighbors by either 
receiving or sending broadcast packets from or to their neighbors. At periodic intervals 
each node signs the whole HELLO message with timestamp and broadcasts it to its 
neighbors. Also when a node receives HELLO messages from its neighbors; it first will 
verify the signature to authenticate the sender and validation of the HELLO message, if 
it correct then the node will check HELLO message for tunneling or wormhole attack 
by using temporal leash concept, if the HELLO message isn't tunneled then the node 
will add or update the entries in its routing table if needed. Receiving the broadcast or 
HELLO from a new neighbor or failing to receive HELLO packets from a node that was 
previously in the neighborhood, indicates that the local connectivity has changed. 
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Step 1: When the source S receives a packet from the transport layer in direction of 
destination D, it checks if a route exists to the destination.  
- If it already has a route, it transmits the packet to the next hop node.  
- Else: 
• S generates a RREQ packet. 
• S signs the RREQ with timestamp. 
• S broadcasts the RREQ to its neighbors. 
• S monitors its neighbors to verify that they forwarded the RREQ and 
isolates the suspicious nodes.  
Step 2: When a node X receives a RREQ request with a source S, a destination D 
and a source-sequence-number (sqn1) then: 
- X verifies the signatures of the RREQ to authenticate the sender and discards it if it 
spoofed. 
- X verifies the timestamp of the RREQ to validate it and discards it if it old. 
- X computes the expiration time of RREQ to check it for tunneling or wormhole 
attack and discards it if it tunneled. 
- X computes the weight (Wi) of the RREQ using the weight function. 
- X looks up in its reverse route entry table. 
Step 3:  If the pair < S , D> exists in the reverse route entry table for node X with a 
weight (W1 ) and a source- sequence-number denoted (sqn2) then: 
- If (Wi > W1 and sqn1=sqn2) or (sqn1 > sqn2) then: 
 • If (X # D) then: 
 * X updates this reverse route entry table. 
 * X increments the HOP_COUNT field by one. 
 * X computes a new hash. 
 * X puts the precursor node's IP address in Precursor_Id field of the 
RREQ. 
 * X maintains its Monitoring_Table entry for the pair <S,D>. 
 * X signs the RREQ with timestamp. 
* X broadcasts the RREQ packet up to date. 
* X monitors its neighbors to verify that they forwarded the RREQ 
and isolates the suspicious nodes. 
* If (precursor node= S) then:  
 X monitors S to prevent flooding attack and isolates S 
if it an attacker. 
  • Else: 
* D waits for T  time to receive all other possible RREQ packets for 
this pair <S,D>. 
* D compares the weights of each feasible path and selects the path 
with the maximum weight as main routing path. 
* D maintains its Monitoring_Table entry for the pair <S,D>. 
* D generates the RREP packet. 
* D signs the RREP with timestamp. 
3.2.2  Route Discovery and Routing Table Management Processes 
The following figure (3.5) shows the pseudo code of these processes in 
SWBAODV routing protocol.  
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* D sends the RREQ packet back to S. 
* D monitors its successor to verify that it forwarded the RREP and 
isolates the suspicious nodes. 
-Else: 
• X discards the RREQ packet. 
Step 4:  
-If the condition in step 3 doesn't satisfied then: 
Go to step 5. 
- Else go to step 6.  
Step 5: X creates a new pair < S, D > in its reverse route entry table with the weight 
equal to Wi and a source-sequence-number equal to sqn1 and do as step 3. 
Step 6:When a node X receives a RREP request from node Y with a source S, a 
destination D, a weight W1, a source-sequence-number sqn1 then: 
- X verifies the signatures of the RREP to authenticate the sender and discards it if it 
spoofed. 
- X verifies the timestamp of the RREP to validate it and discards it if it old. 
- X computes the expiration time of RREP to check it for tunneling or wormhole 
attack and discards it if it tunneled. 
- X looks up in its routing table. 
Step 7: If the pair < S, D > exists in the routing table for node X with a weight 
W2 and a source-sequence-number denoted sqn2  then: 
-If (W1 > W2 and sqn1=sqn2) or (sqn1 > sqn2) 
• If (X # S) 
*  X updates its routing table with the next hop Y 
*  X signs the RREP with timestamp. 
* X forwards the RREP to the previous node  
* X monitors its successor to verify that it forwarded the RREP and 
isolates the suspicious nodes. 
• Else: 
*  S updates its routing table with the next hop Y. 
*  S starts to send data packets to the D through the main routing 
path. 
-Else 
• X discards the RREP packet. 
Step 8: 
-If the condition in step 7 doesn't satisfied then: 
• X creates a new pair < S, D > in its routing table with the next hop Y and 
do as step 7. 
 
Figure (3.5): SWBAODV routing protocol pseudo code 
As shown in figure (3.5) they may be summarized as follows: 
1- When a source node (S) wants to send a message to destination node (D) that 
hasn’t a route to it in its routing table. The node first save the data message in 
the queue, then generate a route request (RREQ) packet, set D flag in the packet 
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header by one, hash a random seed number as TOP_HASH, set Maximum Hop 
Count field, set HOP_COUNT field by zero, sign the RREQ packet with 
timestamp and finally initiates path discovery by broadcasting the RREQ to its 
neighbors. At the same time S will monitor its successor nodes and verifies that 
these nodes forwarded the RREQ packet by using the control packet dropping 
prevention scheme. This scheme will monitor, detect and isolate the suspicious 
nodes by adding them to its Suspicious_List.  
2- When an intermediate node (X) receive a RREQ packet, X first verifies the 
signature to authenticate the sender and validation of the RREQ packet, if it 
correct then X will check RREQ packet for tunneling or wormhole attack by 
using temporal leash concept, if the RREQ packet isn't tunneled then X 
computes the weight (Wi) for RREQ packet, read the RREQ sequence number 
(seqi) and check its reverse route entry table.  
3- If there an entry for pair <S,D> with weight W1 and sequence number seq1 then 
X checks if (Wi>W1 and seqi=seq1) or (seqi>seq1) then X will update its reverse 
route entry for that pair, increments the HOP_COUNT field, computes a new 
hash , puts the precursor node's IP address in Precursor_Id field, maintains its 
Monitoring_Table entry for the pair <S,D>, signs the RREQ with timestamp and 
finally broadcasts the RREQ packet to its neighbors. If the previous condition 
doesn’t satisfy then X will discard the RREQ packet. At the same time X will 
monitor its successor nodes and verifies that these nodes forwarded the RREQ 
packet by using the control packet dropping prevention scheme. This scheme 
will monitor, detect and isolate the suspicious nodes by adding them to its 
Suspicious_List. Also if the precursor node that forwarded RREQ packet to X is 
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S then X will use the FAP scheme to prevent flooding attack by isolate the 
attacker by adding it in its Flooding_Blacklist.  
4- If X doesn’t find any existing entry then it will create a new entry for pair <S,D> 
in its reverse routing entry table with weight equal to Wi and sequence number 
equal to seqi. Then X increments the HOP_COUNT field, computes a new hash , 
puts the precursor node's IP address in Precursor_Id field, maintains its 
Monitoring_Table entry for the pair <S,D>,signs RREQ with timestamp and 
broadcasts the RREQ packet to its neighbors. At the same time X will monitor 
its successor nodes and verifies that these nodes forwarded the RREQ packet by 
using the control packet dropping prevention scheme. Also if the precursor node 
that forwarded RREQ packet to X is S then X will use the FAP scheme to 
prevent flooding attack by isolate the attacker by adding it in its 
Flooding_Blacklist. 
5- When the destination node (D) receive the RREQ packet it will first verifies the 
signature to authenticate the sender and validation of the RREQ packet, if it 
correct then D will check RREQ packet for tunneling or wormhole attack by 
using temporal leash concept, if the RREQ isn't tunneled then D will wait for 
certain time to receive other possible RREQ packets, discards any RREQ that is 
tunneled, computes the weight for each remained feasible path using the weight 
function, selects the path with maximum weight as the main routing path, 
maintains its Monitoring_Table, generates RREP packet , signs it with 
timestamp and finally sends it in the reverse path back to S. At the same time D 
will monitor its successor node and verifies that this node forwarded the RREP 
packet by using the control packet dropping prevention scheme. 
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6- When an intermediate node (X) receive a RREP packet from a node Y, it first 
verifies the signature to authenticate the sender and validation of RREP packet, 
if it correct then X will check RREP for tunneling or wormhole attack by using 
temporal leash concept, if the RREP isn't tunneled then X will check its routing 
table. 
7- If there an entry in its routing table for pair <S,D> then X will update its routing 
table for that pair with next hop Y, signs the RREP with timestamp and finally 
forwards the RREP packet to previous node. To prevent resending the same 
RREP packet X will save it in its route reply buffer and if X receives it again 
from its neighbors then  X will discard it. At the same time X will monitor its 
successor node and verifies that this node forwarded the RREP packet by using 
the control packet dropping prevention scheme. 
8- If X doesn’t find any existing entry in its routing table for pair <S, D> then it 
will create a new entry for pair<S, D> in its routing table with next hop equal to 
Y. Then X will sign RREP with timestamp and forwards it to previous node. At 
the same time X will monitor its successor node and verifies that this node 
forwards the RREP packet by using the control packet dropping prevention 
scheme. 
9- Finally when S receives the RREP packet it first verifies the signature to 
authenticate the sender and validation of the RREP packet, if it correct then it 
will add a new entry for the destination node in its routing table and sends the 
data message from the queue to the next hop. 
3.2.3  Path Maintenance Process  
It may be summarized as follows. When any node along an established path 
moves, so that some of the nodes become unreachable, a RERR packet is wholly signed 
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with timestamp and sent to affected source node. Upon receiving a RERR packet the 
node first verifies the signature to authenticate the sender and validation of the RERR 
packet, if it correct then the node will check RERR packet for tunneling or wormhole 
attack by using temporal leash concept, if the RERR isn't tunneled then the node will 
delete the affected routing entries from its routing table and forwards the REER packet 
to the precursor node in the path. At the same time each node will monitor its successor 
node and verifies that this node forwarded the RERR packet by using the control packet 
dropping prevention scheme. This scheme will monitor, detect and isolate the 
suspicious node by adding it to its Suspicious_List. Finally when the source node S 
receives the REER packet it first verifies the signature to authenticate the sender and 
validation of the RERR packet, if it correct then S will check RERR packet for 
tunneling or wormhole attack by using temporal leash concept, if the RERR isn't 
tunneled then S will delete the affected routing entries from its routing table and restarts 
the path discovery process, if S still needs that route. 
3.3  The difference between SWBAODV and WBAODV 
  WBAODV is unsecured routing protocol in MANET which considers the path 
stability problem and assumes all the nodes in the network are friendly. WBAODV 
enhances the performance, but this isn't enough because when there are suspicious 
nodes in the network launch many types of routing attacks then the improvement of the 
performance which WBAODV is done becomes useless. 
   On the other hand SWBAODV considers both of the path stability and security 
problems simultaneously. SWBAODV selects the stable path with maximum weight 
among all other possible feasible paths as the main routing path and also combines 
many effective security mechanisms together which can monitor, detect, isolate the 
suspicious nodes and prevent routing attacks.  
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Chapter 4 
SWBAODV Security Analysis 
In this chapter we will analyze our new proposed secure routing protocol against 
many famous and identified routing attacks in MANET to ensure its immunity against 
these attacks and how the combined security mechanisms and solutions which described 
in chapters 2 and 3 are cooperated together to make these attacks to fail.  
4.1  MANET Security 
Information Security (InfoSec) is defined as the practice of protecting 
information from accidental or intentional misuse by persons inside or outside of a 
system or organization. Although, an information security problem has a holistic 
approach in its solving mechanism, technical aspects of the problem have significant 
functionalities in this context. Confidentiality, integrity, availability, authorization and 
non-repudiation are the basic security requirements, which are considered in analyzing 
an information security problem. 
Mobile ad hoc networks routing protocols are being designed without security in 
mind. In most of their specifications it is assumed that all the nodes in the network are 
friendly. The security issue has been postponed and there used to be the common 
feeling that it would be possible to make those routing protocols secure by retrofitting 
pre-existing cryptosystems. Nevertheless, securing network transmissions without 
securing the routing protocols is not sufficient. Moreover, by retrofitting cryptosystems, 
security is not necessarily achieved. Therefore, in MANET networks with security 
needs, there must be two security systems: one to protect the data transmission and one 
to make the routing protocol secure. There are already well studied point to point 
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security systems that can be used for protecting network transmissions. But there is not 
much work about how make MANET routing protocols discover routes in a secure 
manner. 
The security schemes for the ad hoc networks routing protocols can be 
categorized into two approaches. The first one is the secure routing approach that aims 
to design and implement routing protocols with security features. While the second 
approach is the Intrusion Detection approach that aims to design and implement 
intrusion detection component in the ad hoc network 
The security requirements for MANET routing protocols include: 
(1) Source authentication: The receiver should be able to confirm that the identity of the 
source is indeed who or what it claims to be. 
(2) Neighbor authentication: The receiver should be able to confirm that the identity of 
the sender (i.e., one hop previous node) is indeed who or what it claims to be. 
(3) Message integrity: The receiver should be able to verify that the content of a 
message has not been altered either maliciously or accidentally in transit. 
(4) Access control: It is necessary to ensure that mobile nodes seeking to gain access to 
the network have the appropriate access rights. 
A node is malicious if it is an attacker that cannot authenticate itself as a 
legitimate node due to the lack of valid cryptographic information. A node is 
compromised if it is an inside attacker who is behaving maliciously but can be 
authenticated by the network as a legitimate node and is being trusted by other nodes. A 
node is selfish when it tends to deny providing services for the benefit of other nodes in 
order to save its own resources. 
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4.2  MANET Routing Attacks 
In ad hoc networks, attacks can be classified into active and passive attacks. In 
passive attacks, attackers don’t disrupt the operation of routing protocol but only 
attempt to discover valuable information by listening to the routing traffic. An active 
attacker injects packets into the network, eavesdrops and also tries to compromise the 
network with denial of service. In the active attacks, the malicious nodes introduce false 
information to confuse the network topology. They can either attract traffic to them and 
then drop or compromise the packets. They can also send false information and lead 
packets to the wrong node and cause congestion in one area. The attacks can either 
target at the routing procedure or try to flood the networks. 
Most common attack patterns identified in ad hoc network environment are the 
following. 
4.2.1  Modification Attack 
Malicious nodes can modify the protocol fields of messages passed among 
nodes. Such attacks compromise the integrity of routing computation. By altering 
routing information, an attacker can cause network traffic to be dropped, redirected to a 
different destination or take a long route to the destination increasing communication 
delays. For example in figure (4.1) suppose that M is a malicious node and S wishes to 
communicate with X and that S has an unexpired route to X in its route cache. S 
transmits a data packet toward X with the source route S --> A --> B --> M --> C --> D 
--> X contained in the packet’s header. When M receives the packet, it can alter the 
source route in the packet’s header, such as deleting D from the source route. 
Consequently, when C receives the altered packet, it attempts to forward the packet to 
X. Since X cannot hear C, the transmission is unsuccessful. 
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     Figure (4.1): Example of modification attack in MANET 
4.2.2  Fabrication Attack 
Fabrication refers to attacks performed by generating false routing messages. 
Following is an example of an attack launched by sending false route error message. 
Suppose S has a route to D via nodes A and B, as in figure (4.2). A malicious node M 
can launch a denial-of-service attack by continually sending route error messages to A 
spoofing B, indicating a broken link between B and D. A receives the spoofed route 
error message thinking that it came from B. A deletes its routing table entry for D and 
forwards the route error message on to the upstream node, who then also delete its 
routing table entry. If M listens and broadcasts spoofed route error messages whenever 
a route is established from S to D, M can successfully prevent communications between 
S and D. 
 
Figure (4.2): Fabrication attack in MANET 
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4.2.3  Spoofing Attack 
A single malicious node in the ad hoc network can spoof the nodes identity in 
order to forward packets through it. Later the information can be used to create denial-
of-service attacks. 
4.2.4  Reply Attack 
As topology changes, old control messages, though valid in the past, describe a 
topology configuration that no longer exists. An attacker can perform a reply attack by 
recording old valid control messages and re-sending them, to make other nodes update 
their routing tables with stale routes. 
4.2.5  Rushing Attack 
An offensive that can be carried out against on-demand routing protocols. 
Typically, on-demand routing protocols state that nodes must forward only the first 
received Route Request from each route discovery; all further received Route requests 
are ignored. This is done in order to reduce cluttering. The attack consists, for the 
adversary, in quickly forwarding its Route Request messages when a route discovery is 
initiated. If the Route Requests that first reach the target’s neighbors are those of the 
attacker, then any discovered route includes the attacker. 
4.2.6  Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack 
A denial of service attack in general could be launched at any layer of an ad hoc 
network. On the physical and media access control layers, an adversary could employ 
jamming to interfere with communication on physical channels. On the network layer, 
an adversary could disrupt the routing protocol and disconnect the network. On the 
higher layers, an adversary could break down high-level services. In the routing 
mechanism a source node sends route request messages to all neighbors to find a route 
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to the destination node. In the denial-of-service case a malicious node in between can 
successful send an erroneous route message to the source route to disrupt the service. 
For example a malicious node can redirect the network traffic and conduct DoS attacks 
by modifying message fields or by forwarding routing message with false values. In 
figure (4.3), M is a malicious node which can keep traffic from reaching X by 
continuously advertising to B a shorter route to X than the route to X that C advertises. 
In this way, malicious nodes can easily cause traffic subversion and denial of service 
(DoS) by simply altering protocol fields. 
 
Figure (4.3): Example of DoS attack in MANET 
4.2.7  Selfish Attack 
By dropping RREQ (Route Request) or RREP (route reply)  packets a selfish 
node could exclude itself from routes and thereby avoid receiving data packets to 
forward in order to save its power. Selfishness misbehavior can cause DoS later. 
4.2.8  Routing Tables Overflow Attack 
Routing tables overflow attack attempts to create routes to nonexistent nodes. 
The goal is to create enough routes to prevent new routes from being created or to 
overwhelm the protocol implementation. The proactive algorithms are more vulnerable 
to table overflow attacks than reactive algorithms because they attempt to discover 





4.2.9  Sybil Attack 
The Sybil attack refers to represent multiple identities for malicious intent. This 
can be achieved if the malicious nodes collude and share their secret keys. As illustrated 
in figure (4.4), A is connected with B, C and the malicious node, M1. If M1 represents 
other nodes M2, M3 and M4 (e.g. by using their secret keys), this makes A believe it 
has 6 neighbors instead of 3. In a mobile ad hoc network that uses multi-path routing, 
the possibility of choosing a path that contains a malicious node (e.g. M1) will be 
largely increased.  
  
Figure (4.4): Sybil attack in MANET 
 
4.2.10  Blackhole Attack 
In Black hole attack a malicious node uses the routing protocol to advertise itself 
as having the shortest path to the node whose packets it wants to intercept. In second 
step, the attacker consumes the packets and never forwards. In an advanced form, the 
attacker suppresses or modifies packets originating from some nodes, while leaving the 
data from the other nodes unaffected. In this way, the attacker falsified the neighboring 
nodes that monitor the ongoing packets. In figure (4.5), node 1 wants to send data 
packets to node 4 and initiates the route discovery process. We assume that node 3 is a 
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malicious node and it claims that it has route to the destination whenever it receives 
RREQ packets, and immediately sends the response to node 1. If the response from the 
node 3 reaches first to node 1 then node 1 thinks that the route discovery is complete, 
ignores all other reply messages and begins to send data packets to node 3. As a result, 
all packets through the malicious node is consumed or lost. 
 
Figure (4.5): Blackhole Attack in MANET 
 
4.2.11  Tunneling Attack 
Ad hoc networks have an implicit assumption that any node can be located 
adjacent to any other node. A tunneling attack is where two or more nodes may 
collaborate to encapsulate and exchange messages between them along existing data 
routes. One vulnerability is that two such nodes may collaborate to falsely represent the 
length of available paths by encapsulating and tunneling the routing message between 
them. In figure (4.6), M1 and M2 are two malicious nodes that encapsulate data packets 
and falsified the route lengths. Suppose node S wishes to form a route to D and initiates 
route discovery. When M1 receives a RREQ from S, M1 encapsulates the RREQ and 
tunnels it to M2 through an existing data route, in this case {M1 --> A --> B --> C --> 
M2}. When M2 receives the encapsulated RREQ on to D as if had only traveled {S --> 
M1 --> M2 --> D}. Neither M1 nor M2 update the packet header. After route discovery, 
the destination finds two routes from S of unequal length: one is of 5 and another is of 
4. If M2 tunnels the RREP back to M1, S would falsely consider the path to D via M1 is 
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better than the path to D via A. Thus, tunneling can prevent honest intermediate nodes 
from correctly incrementing the metric used to measure path lengths. 
 
Figure (4.6): Path length spoofed by Tunneling 
4.2.12  Wormhole Attack 
In a wormhole attack, an attacker receives packets at one point in the network, 
“tunnels” them to another point in the network, and then replays them into the network 
from that point. It is called tunneling attack because the colluding malicious nodes are 
linked through a private network connection which is invisible at higher layers. In 
figure (4.7) two attackers M1 and M2, connected by a high-speed off-channel link, are 
strategically placed at different ends of a network. These attackers then record the 
wireless data they overhear, forward it to each other, and replay the packets at the other 
end of the network. Replaying valid network messages at improper places, wormhole 
attackers can make far apart nodes believe they are immediate neighbors, and force all 
communications between affected nodes to go through them. 
. 
 
Figure (4.7): Wormhole Attack in MANET 
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4.2.13  Flooding Attack 
In the Ad Hoc Flooding Attack, the attack node violates the rules to exhaust the 
network resource. Firstly, the attacker selects many IP addresses which are not in the 
networks if he knows the scope of IP address in the networks. Because no node can 
answer RREP packets for these RREQ, the reverse route in the route table of node will 
be conserved for longer. The attacker can select random IP addresses if he can not know 
scope of IP address. Secondly, the attacker successively originates mass RREQ 
messages for these void IP addresses. The attacker tries to send excessive RREQ 
without considering RREQ_RATELIMIT within per second. The attacker will resend 
the RREQ packets without waiting for the RREP or round-trip time, if he uses out these 
IP addresses. The TTL of RREQ is set up to a maximum without using expanding ring 
search method. In the Flooding Attacks, the whole network will be full of RREQ 
packets which the attacker sends. The communication bandwidth is exhausted by the 
flooded RREQ packets and the resource of nodes is exhausted at the same time. Figure 
(4.8) shows an example of the flooding attack where node H is the attacker and try to 
flood the network. 
 
Figure (4.8): Flooding Attack in MANET 
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4.3  Evaluation of Secure Routing Protocols against Attacks 
In this section we analyzed six of famous secure routing protocols in MANET 
against the most commonly routing attacks which are described in the previous section. 
4.3.1  SEAD 
SEAD was developed based on Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) 
protocol and incorporates One-Way Hash function to authenticate in the routing update 
mechanism in order to enhance the routing security. Securing a table driven protocol is 
harder than securing an on demand protocol due to the existence of predefined routes. 
Distance vector protocols encapsulate the route information into a hop count value and a 
next hop. An attacker cannot create a valid route with a larger sequence number that it 
received due to the properties of hash function. As SEAD incorporates neighbor 
authentication through Hash functions, an attacker can not compromise any node. 
SEAD is prone through wormhole attack. Even if authentication is provided using hash 
functions, a wormhole attack is possible through tunneling the packets from one 
location and retransmitting them from other location into the network. All packets in the 
wormhole attack flow in a circle around instead of reaching the destination. Routing 
table overflow attacks are possible in SEAD, as SEAD is developed based on a table 
driven approach. A compromised node can advertise routes to nodes which are not in 
the network and there by fill in the space allocated in the routing table with false node 
routes. Spoofing attack is possible through compromised node acting like a destination 
node in the route discovery process by spoofing the identity of the destination node that 
can cause route destruction. Blackhole attack is also possible through a compromised 
node advertising the shortest roots to non-existing nodes in the network. Tunneling and 
DOS attacks are also possible through compromised nodes. Table driven protocols are 
much more prone to security threats. Rushing, Sybil, Selfish and Flooding attacks are 
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possible because there are no any existing security mechanisms to cope these attacks in 
SEAD routing protocol. 
4.3.2  Ariadne 
Ariadne was developed based on an on demand protocol, Dynamic Source 
Routing (DSR). Ariadne uses MAC s and shared keys between nodes to authenticate 
between nodes and use time stamps for packet lifetime. Wormhole attacks are possible 
in Ariadne through two compromised nodes. Ariadne prevents spoofing attacks with 
time stamps. The use of source routes prevents loops, since a packet passing through 
only legitimate nodes will not be forwarded into a loop due to time stamps. Rushing, 
Sybil, Selfish and Flooding attacks are possible because there are no any existing 
security mechanisms to cope these attacks in Ariadne routing protocol. 
4.3.3  SRP 
Secure routing protocol (SRP) was developed based on Dynamic Source 
Routing (DSR). The intermediate nodes participating in the route discovery measure the 
frequency of queries received from their neighbors and maintains a priority ranking 
inversely proportional to the query rate. So the malicious compromised nodes 
participating in the network are given least priority to deal with. The security analysis of 
SRP is similar to Ariadne as both are based on DSR protocol. 
4.3.4  ARAN 
ARAN uses public key cryptography and a central certification authority server 
for node authentication and neighbor node authentication in route discovery. Denial-of-
service attacks are possible with compromised nodes. Malicious nodes cannot initiate an 
attack due to the neighbor node authentication through certificates. Participating nodes 
broadcast unnecessary route requests across the network. An attacker can cause 
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congestion in the network, there by compromising the functionality of the network. 
Spoofing attacks are prevented by ARAN through node level signatures. Each packet in 
the network is signed by its private key before broadcasted to the next level and checked 
for the authentication. So spoofing the identity of node is hampered by ARAN. Due to 
the strong cryptographic features of ARAN, malicious nodes cannot participate in any 
type of attack patterns. Only compromised nodes can participate in any attack pattern. 
Tunneling attacks are possible in ARAN. Two compromised neighbor nodes can 
collaborate to falsely represent the length of available paths by encapsulating and 
tunneling the routing message between them. Wormhole attack is also possible through 
two compromised nodes. Table overflow, blackhole attacks are impossible due to node 
level authentication with signatures. Rushing, Sybil, Selfish and Flooding attacks are 
possible because there are no any existing security mechanisms to cope these attacks in 
ARAN routing protocol. 
4.3.5  SAODV 
SAODV is a widely implemented protocol in industry due to its strong security 
features. SADOV uses a central key management in its routing topology. Digital 
signatures are used to authenticate at node level and hash chain is used to prevent the 
altering of node counts. Tunneling attacks are possible through two compromised 
nodes. Wormhole attacks are always possible with compromised nodes in any ad hoc 
network topology. The use of sequence numbers could prevent most of the possible 
reply attacks. Rushing, Sybil, Selfish and Flooding attacks are possible because there 





4.3.6  SAR 
SAR was developed using a trust-based framework. Each node in the network is 
assigned with a trust level. So the attacks on this framework can be analyzed based on 
trust level and message integrity. Trust Level: SAR routing mechanism is based on the 
behavior associated with the trust level of a user. It is a binding between the identity of 
the user and the associated trust level. To follow the trust-based hierarchy, 
cryptographic techniques like: encryption, public key certificates, shared secrets, etc. 
are employed. Message integrity: The compromised nodes can utilize the information 
flow in between nodes and reading of packets to launch attacks. It results in corruption 
of information, confidentiality of the information, and in denial of network services. 
The Security analysis on the attack patterns is based on the trust based framework. So 
the analysis depends on the key management used and the cryptographic systems 
applied. In general the security analysis of SAR is similar to SAODV routing protocol. 
4.4  Evaluation of SWBAODV against Attacks 
In this section we analyzed our new secure routing protocol against the most 
commonly routing attacks which are described in the section 4.2. 
4.4.1  Modification Attack 
SWBAODV uses security primitives like hash chains to secure mutable message 
field (hop count) and digital signature to secure the non-mutable fields. Any malicious 
node try to modify the content of the routing message, then the next hop node will 
discover the modification and will discard the message because we can’t get two 




4.4.2  Fabrication Attack 
SWBAODV uses digital signature to authenticate the RERR messages and the 
non-mutable fields of the RREQ and RREP messages. It is also provides an end-to-end 
authentication and node-to-node verification of these messages. So SWBAODV is 
secure against fabrication attack. 
4.4.3  Spoofing Attack 
SWBAODV uses digital signature to authenticate the identity of the nodes and 
to provide an end-to-end authentication and node-to-node verification of the routing 
messages. So SWBAODV is secure against spoofing attack. 
4.4.4  Reply Attack 
SWBAODV uses digital signature with timestamp to cope this attack. When a 
node receives a message it verifies the signature to authenticate the sender and then 
checks the timestamp to validate the message’s freshness. When a node finds that the 
received message is old then it will discard it. Also another thing we can use as a 
pointer of the freshness of the routing messages is the Sequence Number of the message 
which is a non-mutable field and is increased monotonically when a node initiates new 
routing messages.  So SWBAODV is secure against reply attack. 
4.4.5  Rushing Attack 
SWBAODV uses digital signature to authenticate the sender’s identity, then on 
contrary of on-demand routing protocols, SWBAODV depends on the stable weight-
based routing strategy that allows node to forward all the RREQ packets that received 
and which have larger weight than it has in its reverse route entry table for that source-
destination pair. Then destination node selects the stable path with maximum weight 
among all feasible paths as a main routing path. This process doesn’t guarantee that the 
 ٥٦
attacker be in the main routing path. The basis of the attack is overcome because the 
probability of the attacker to falsely be in the routing path is very low. So SWBAODV 
is secure against rushing attack. 
4.4.6  Denial-of-Service Attack 
SWBAODV uses control packets dropping prevention scheme to cope this 
attack. This scheme will monitor, detect and isolate the suspicious nodes. So 
SWBAODV is secure against DoS attack There are two main metrics that we can used 
to evaluate the efficiency of control packets dropping prevention scheme: true isolation 
rate and false isolation rate. True Isolation Rate (TIR) or true positives, represents the 
efficiency on packet droppers isolation. It is the average rate of true isolation computed 
as follows:  
 
Where tii: is the true isolation of node i, i.e. the number of misbehaving nodes 
monitored and detected by node i, then isolated in the network. mi: the number of 
misbehaving nodes monitored by node i. n: the number of nodes. k: the number of 
nodes that have monitored misbehaving nodes (whose mi ≠ 0). False Isolation Rate 
(FIR) is very similar to the previous one. It is the average rate of false isolations, given 
by the following formula: 
 
Where fii is the false isolations of node i, i.e. the number of well-behaved nodes 
monitored and wrongly detected by node i and isolated, m'i  is the number of well-
behaving nodes monitored by node i, and finally k' is number of nodes that have 
monitored well-behaving nodes (whose m'i ≠ 0).  
 ٥٧
We evaluated the efficiency of control packets dropping prevention scheme 
which prevent the DoS attack by using simulations with 50 nodes. These simulations 
are based on the model and parameters which are described in section 5.2 and table 5.1. 
Figures (4.9) and (4.10) show the true isolation rate and false isolation rate of 
SWBAODV routing protocol with different node's mobility speeds, respectively. These 
results were obtained by simulating RERR dropping (malicious behavior) which allow 
the malicious nodes to launch the denial-of-service attack by preventing the destruction 
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Figure (4.10): False Isolation Rate versus mobility speeds with 50 nodes 
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We can observe that SWBAODV clearly outperforms all six secure routing 
protocols which are described in section 4.3 with respect to packet dropper isolation, 
since those latter simply do not detect such a misbehavior. Figure (4.9) shows how 
SWBAODV, has high true isolations, especially in high mobility environment. We can 
also observe that the true isolation rate is decreased when the mobility speed is 
increased and that due to the increased probability of packet dropping which happened 
due to the route failures rather than malicious drops, but SWBAODV may falsely 
detected it as malicious behavior. Although of the decreasing in the true isolation rate 
when the mobility speed is increased the results are still very high and the true isolation 
rate equals to 88% when the mobility speed equals to 13 m/s. On the other hand, figure 
(4.10) shows that the false isolation rate is very low and it didn't exceed 10 % when the 
mobility speed equals to 13 m/s. It is more importantly that the SWBAODV is less 
affected with the mobility in comparison of other secure routing protocols in MANET. 
4.4.7  Selfish Attack 
SWBAODV uses control packets dropping prevention scheme to cope this 
attack. This scheme will monitor, detect and isolate the suspicious nodes. So 
SWBAODV is secure against selfish attack. We evaluated the efficiency of control 
packets dropping prevention scheme against the selfish attack in the same way that we 
are used in the previous sub section by using simulations with 50 nodes. These 
simulations are based on the model and parameters which are described in section 5.2 
and table 5.1. 
Figures (4.11) and (4.12) show true isolation rate and false isolation rate of 
SWBAODV routing protocol with different node's mobility speeds, respectively. These 
results were obtained by simulating RREQ and RREP dropping (selfish behavior) which 
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Figure (4.11): True Isolation Rate versus mobility speeds with 50 nodes 
 We can observe that SWBAODV clearly outperforms all six secure routing 
protocols which are described in section 4.3 with respect to packet dropper isolation, 
since those latter simply do not detect such a misbehavior. Figure (4.11) shows how 
SWBAODV has high true isolations, especially in high mobility environment. We can 
also observe that the true isolation rate is decreased when the mobility speed is 
increased and that due to the increased probability of packet dropping which happened 
due to the route failures rather than malicious drops, but SWBAODV may falsely 
detected it as selfish behavior. Although of the decreasing in the true isolation rate when 
the mobility speed is increased the results are still very high and the true isolation rate 
equals to 80% when the mobility speed equals to 13 m/s. On the other hand, figure 
(4.12) shows that the false isolation rate is very low and it didn't exceed 15 % when the 
mobility speed equals to 13 m/s. This increase of false isolation rate in figure (4.12) in 
comparison of that in figure (4.10)  is due to that the number of RREQ and RREP 
messages is more than the number of RERR messages. It is more importantly to note 
that the SWBAODV is less affected with the mobility in comparison of other secure 
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Figure (4.12): False Isolation Rate versus mobility speeds with 50 nodes 
4.4.8  Routing Tables Overflow Attack 
SWBAODV is on-demand routing protocol and uses digital signature to 
authenticate the identity of the nodes, provide an end-to-end authentication and node-to-
node verification of the routing messages. Also the destination is only allowed to reply 
to RREQ packets. So SWBAODV is secure against routing table overflow attack. 
4.4.9  Sybil Attack 
SWBAODV uses digital signature to authenticate the identity of the nodes, 
provide an end-to-end authentication and node-to-node verification of the routing 
messages. Also the destination node is only allowed to reply to RREQ packets and 
selects the stable path with the maximum weight among all feasible paths depending on 
weight-based routing strategy. This process doesn’t guarantee that the attacker be in the 
main routing path. So SWBAODV is secure against Sybil attack. 
4.4.10  Blackhole Attack 
SWBAODV strict that only the destination node can reply to RREQ packets, so 
the basis of the attack is overcome. When a malicious node receives a RREQ packet and 
it isn't the destination node then SWBAODV forces this node to forward the packet to 
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its neighbors even if it knows the fresh route to the destination because SWBAODV 
uses the stable weight-based routing strategy which selects the routing path with the 
maximum weight and it isn't necessary the shortest path as in other on-demand routing 
protocols. Also if we suppose that the malicious node is located in the routing path 
between the source and the destination nodes and try to drop packets, then packet 
dropping prevention scheme will monitor, detect and isolate the suspicious node. So 
SWBAODV is secure against blackhole attack. 
4.4.11  Tunneling Attack 
SWBAODV uses temporal leash concept to cope this attack. When any node 
receives any routing message first it verifies the sender, then it will check the expiration 
time of the packet to detect if the packet traveled further than the leash allows and 
discards it if that happened. So SWBAODV is secure against tunneling attack. 
4.4.12  Wormhole Attack 
SWBAODV uses temporal leash concept to allow the receiver of a packet to 
detect if the packet traveled further than the leash allows and discards it if that 
happened. So SWBAODV is secure against wormhole attack. We evaluated the 
efficiency of temporal leash concept to prevent the wormhole attack by using 
simulations with 50 nodes. These simulations are based on the model and parameters 
which are described in section 5.2 and table 5.1.  
Figure (4.13) shows the wormhole link detection rate as a function of the tunnel 
length. Tunnel length refers to the number of hops between the malicious nodes. We 
define a wormhole link detection rate as the proportion of the number of detected links 
that contain wormhole tunnel to all links that contain wormhole tunnels. The results 
show that a wormhole is more detected in the configuration where this attack is 
launched on a longer hops count. This result is quite obvious, since through a wormhole 
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tunnel, packets are encapsulated and decapsulated repeatedly, which leads to a more 
delayed transmissions. In the case of less than 3 hops, detection rate is relatively low, 
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Figure (4.13): Wormhole Link Detection Rate versus Tunnel Length with 50 nodes 
Figure (4.14) shows the results of the wormhole detection accuracy. Detection 
accuracy is measured as the ratio of links that contain effectively wormhole tunnels to 
the links that are judged suspicious by temporal leash concept. The results show that the 
detection accuracy depends on the tunnel length. However, the detection accuracy 
increased dramatically as the tunnel length increased. But we can observe that the 
wormhole detection accuracy decreased when the mobility speed increased more than 7 
m/s and this can be explained by the number of neighbors that can be selected to form 
wormhole tunnels by malicious nodes. However, if the number of nodes in the network 
becomes larger, the malicious nodes are more likely to have many neighbors even 
though they are far away from each others and connected through a longer wormhole 
tunnel. Moreover, each node sends periodically routing control messages, which 
increases the load in dense networks. As these routing control messages are tunneled 
through the wormhole tunnel, the traffic increases dramatically and congestion becomes 
inevitable through the path of that wormhole tunnel. This makes the legitimate nodes 
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suspect and decide faultily some links as containing wormhole tunnels because of the 
increased delays. Although of this decreasing in the detection accuracy the results are 
still very high and the wormhole detection accuracy equals to 85% when the mobility 
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Figure (4.14): Wormhole Detection Accuracy versus Tunnel Length with 50 nodes 
4.4.13  Flooding Attack 
SWBAODV uses the flooding attack prevention scheme to cope this attack. This 
scheme will detect and isolate the attacker. So SWBAODV is secure against flooding 
attack. We evaluated the efficiency of flooding attack prevention scheme by using 
simulations with 50 nodes. These simulations are based on the model and parameters 
which are described in section 5.2 and table 5.1. In order to carefully observe the impact 
on performance of mobile ad hoc networks, we assumed that rates of attacking packets 
are respectively, 30 packets/second and 50 packets/second. In other words, the intruder 
respectively floods 30 and 50 packets every second. We calculated packet delivery rate 
every 100 seconds. At 100 seconds of simulation experiment, we totalized packet 
delivery rate from 0 to 100 seconds. At 200 seconds of simulation experiment, we 
totalized packet delivery rate from 100 to 200 seconds. The rest may be deduced by 
analogy. There is not attacking packets from 0 to 300 seconds in all scenarios. The 
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intruder starts to attack at 300 seconds to 900 seconds. The simulation results are as 
follows. Figures (4.15) and (4.16) show the performance of SWBAODV and 
WBAODV routing protocols under 30 and 50 attacking packets every second, 
respectively.  
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Figure (4.15): Receive Rate versus Simulation time under 30 attacking packets 
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Figure (4.16): Receive Rate versus Simulation time under 50 attacking packets 
 We can observe that the performance of SWBAODV is better than that of 
WBAODV routing protocol, because SWBAODV is integrated with FAP. In figure 
(4.15) the packet delivery ratio of SWBAODV increased from 50% to 95% after the 
attack is started. In figure (4.16) with more attacking packets every second, the 
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performance of WBAODV network falls quickly. When FAP takes effect, the 
performance of SWBAODV becomes better and packet delivery rate keep up about 
90%. It implies that the Flooding Attack Prevention scheme efficiently resists the Ad 
Hoc Flooding Attack by identifying the attackers and isolating them from the networks. 
4.5  Comparison between SWBAODV and other Secure Routing 
 Protocols  
In this section we will compare between SWBAODV and six of secure routing 
protocols in MANET according to their immunity against routing attacks. From the 
results which we obtained in sections 4.3 and 4.4 we can make the comparison between 
them. The following Table (4.1) shows the mapping between the attack patterns and the 
secure routing protocols. Note that Y indicates that the attack is possible and the secure 
routing protocol is vulnerable against this attack also N indicates that the attack is not 
possible and the secure routing protocol is immune against this attack.  
From this comparison we can see that SEAD is the weakest and the SWBAODV 
is the strongest. Also all the proposed secure routing protocols success to prevent some 
attacks and fail in others, But SWBAODV success to prevent or mitigate all of them 
because it use multiple security solutions and mechanisms that combined together with 







Table (4.1): Comparison between Secure Routing Protocols and SWBAODV 
Ad hoc Secure Routing Protocols Attack 
Patterns SEAD Ariadne SRP ARAN SAODV SAR SWBAODV 
Modification N N N N N N N 
Fabrication Y N N N N N N 
Spoofing Y N N N N N N 
Reply Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
Rushing Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
DoS Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
Selfish Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
Routing table 
overflow 
Y N N N N N N 
Sybil Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
Blackhole Y N N N N N N 
Tunneling Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
Wormhole Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
Flooding Y Y Y Y Y Y N 
Y = Attack possible, N = Attack not possible 
4.6  SWBAODV and Security Goals 
The ultimate goals of the security solutions for MANETs are to provide security 
services, such as authentication, confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-
repudiation, and availability to mobile users. In order to achieve this goal, the security 
solution should provide complete protection spanning the entire protocol stack. The 
common security services are described below. 
1- Availability: ensures the survivability of network services despite denial of service 
attack. SWBAODV provide availability when it prevents denial of service attacks. 
2- Confidentiality: ensures that certain information is never disclosed to unauthorized 
entities. SWBAODV doesn’t provide confidentiality directly, because in network layer 
the routing information is not secret. But SWBAODV can provide privacy by applying 
another layer of encryption/decryption above SWBAODV. 
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3- Integrity: guarantees that a message being transferred is never corrupted. 
SWBAODV provide message integrity, because it uses digital signature and hash chains 
to secure routing messages. 
4- Authentication: enables a node to ensure the identity of the peer node it is 
communicating with. SWBAODV provide an end-to-end authentication and node-to-
node verification of routing messages, because it uses the digital signature with 
timestamp. 
5- Non-repudiation: ensures that the origin of a message cannot deny having sent the 



















SWBAODV Performance Analysis 
After we proposed our SWBAODV routing protocol and analyzed it against the 
most common attacks in MANET which prove its immunity against these attacks, now 
we will test its performance. To do that we will implement SWBAODV protocol and 
then we will subject it to extensive tests with many well-known ad hoc performance 
metrics. We choose the popular network simulator Java In Simulation Time for Scalable 
Wireless Ad hoc Networks (JiST/SWAN) as the simulator primarily to implement 
methods because it is widespread use in the academic community and the 
comprehensive manuals and tutorials that are freely available. It is possible to simulate 
a mobile multi-hop ad hoc wireless network in JiST/SWAN using simulated 802.11 
MAC layer. 
5.1  JisT/SWAN Simulator 
We implement the SWBAODV routing protocol with JiST/SWAN simulation 
tool and we use this tool to ensure the new protocol efficiency. JiST/SWAN refers to 
Java in Simulation Time Scalable Wireless Ad hoc Network Simulator. JiST is a high-
performance discrete event simulation engine that runs over a standard Java virtual 
machine. It is a prototype of a new general-purpose approach to building discrete event 
simulators, called virtual machine-based simulation that unifies the traditional systems 
and language-based simulator designs. The resulting simulation platform is surprisingly 
efficient. SWANS is a scalable wireless network simulator built atop the JiST platform. 
It was created primarily because existing network simulation tools are not sufficient for 
current research needs, and its performance serves as a validation of the virtual  
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machine-based approach to simulator construction. SWANS is organized as 
independent software components that can be composed to form complete wireless 
network or sensor network configurations. Its capabilities are similar to ns2 and 
GloMoSim, but is able to simulate much larger networks. SWANS leverages the JiST 
design to achieve high simulation throughput, save memory, and run standard Java 
network applications over simulated networks. In addition, SWANS implements a data 
structure, called hierarchical binning, for efficient computation of signal propagation 
[39]. 
The AODV code is a part of the SWAN code base. First we modify this code to 
accomplish standard WBAODV routing protocol which described in section 2.3. After 
we test WBAODV and ensure its performance we modify its code to accomplish our 
SWBAODV routing protocol which described in section 3.2. 
5.2  Simulation Setup (model) 
We decide to use a simulator for performance study because a practical 
implementation of an ad hoc network was obviously not feasible. As shown in table 
(5.1), we first made some assumptions on the parameters of the system architecture in 
the simulations. 





No. of nodes 40-120 
Simulation duration 600 sec 
No. of repetitions 6 times 
Radio transmission range 100 m 
Physical/MAC layer IEEE 802 
Pause time 100 sec 
Mobility model Random waypoint model 
Node movement 4-13 m sec
-1
 
Data sending rate 2 Kbps 
Each packet 2 MB 
 ٧٠
The simulations modeled a network in a 600 x 600 m
2
 area with 40 to 120 
mobile nodes. The radio transmission range for each node was assumed to be 100 
meters. The speed of each mobile node was assumed varied from 4 to 13 m sec
-1
. In 
these simulations we used the same communication pattern for all mobility simulations. 
The traffic pattern consisted of Constant Bit Rate (CBR) traffic type. In these 
simulations we did not use TCP because we did not want to investigate TCP, which 
uses flow control, retransmit features and so on. The communication traffic and 
scenarios simulations are randomly generated by JiST/SWAN itself. The initial 
positions of the nodes were uniformly distributed throughout the network.  Node 
mobility was simulated according to the random waypoint mobility model, in which 
each node travels to a randomly selected location at a configured speed and then pauses 
for a configured pause time, before choosing another random location and repeating the 
same steps. Each simulation was run for 600 second. 
Table (5.2) illustrates the best values of the parameters that are used with control 
packet dropping prevention scheme for both the directed and broadcast packets. Also 
table (5.3) illustrates the best values of the parameters that are used with flooding attack 
prevention scheme. In wormhole attack prevention scheme using temporal leash we 




Table (5.2): Control Packets Dropping Prevention Scheme best parameters' values 
Packet type Parameters Value 
Tolerance threshold 3 
Number of witnesses 2 
 
Directed packets 
Redemption pace 0.2 
Tolerance threshold 1 
Number of witnesses 2 
 
Broadcast packets 
Redemption pace 0.8 
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Table (5.3): Flooding Attack Prevention Scheme best  parameters' values 
Parameters Value 
Rate_RREQ_Threshold 10 
Flooding_Intruder_Discovery_Interval 1 sec 
 
5.3  Experimental Results 
After we implemented SWBAODV routing protocol using JiST/SWAN 
simulator we tested its performance with some of MANET secure routing protocols. 
Due to code availability and time limitations we compared SWBAODV with only two 
of famous MANET secure routing protocols: SAODV and Ariadne. SAODV is secure 
routing protocol based on AODV routing protocol and Ariadne is secure routing 
protocol based on DSR routing protocol. We also compared the performance of 
SWBAODV with WBAODV performance as well. 
We used the following five well-known ad hoc network performance metrics in 
the evaluation of SWBAODV, SAODV, Ariadne and WBAODV routing protocols. 
5.3.1  Average End-to-End Delay 
This is the average delay between, sending the data packet by the CBR source 
and its receipt at the corresponding CBR receiver. This includes all the delays caused 
during route acquisition, buffering and processing at intermediate nodes and 
retransmission delays at the MAC layer. It includes only all the packets that are 
correctly received. Lost packets are obviously not included in this measurement since 
their packet delay is infinity. The following equation is used to calculate this metric: 
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Where ‘n’ is the total number of packets. A higher value of end-to-end delay means that 
the network is congested and hence the routing protocol doesn’t perform well.  
Figures (5.1) and (5.2) show the average end-to-end delay of SWBAODV, 
SAODV, Ariadne and WBAODV routing protocols with different number of mobile 
nodes and mobility speeds, respectively. As shown in figures (5.1) and (5.2), the 
average end-to-end delay increased as the number of mobile nodes or the mobility speed 
increased, because when number of nodes or mobility increases then more route 














































































Figure (5.2): Average end-to-end delay versus mobility speeds with 50 nodes 
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The average end-to-end delay for SWBAODV is higher than that for SAODV 
and Ariadne. This is because SWBAODV have extra mechanism to select a path and it 
is also possible that SWBAODV select a longer hop route since it has to consider the 
stability problem. In addition, SAODV and Ariadne only select the shortest path or 
fastest transmission path. The extra mechanism in SWBAODV to select the path that 
increased the delay include that every intermediate node receives the RREQ packet will 
compute the weight using the weight function before broadcasts it to its neighbors, also 
only the destination can be reply to the RREQ packet and the destination will wait for 
certain interval to obtain all feasible paths before reply , but in other AODV-based 
secure routing protocols any intermediate node that know the fresh route to destination 
can reply and no any computations are needed.  
Also the average end-to-end delay for SWBAODV is higher than that for 
WBAODV and this because SWBAODV used some cryptographic primitives which 
didn't exist in WBAODV like digital signature with time stamp and hash chains which 
considered being costly and increased the end-to-end delay, but these primitives are 
important and essential to secure routing messages. Another fact that SWBAODV used 
monitoring procedures and temporal leash test which are done node-by-node along the 
routing path which increased the total end-to-end delay. Finally although all the latter 
things which increased the delay, but the difference between SWBAODV, WBAODV, 
SAODV and Ariadne routing protocols in delay is still acceptable and not very high. 
5.3.2  Packet Delivery Ratio 
Also called throughput which is the ratio of the number of data packets 
successfully received by a destination over the number of data packets delivered by the 
corresponding source both at the application layer. Packets that are sent but not received 
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are lost in the network due to malicious drops, route failures, congestion, and wireless 
channel losses. The following equation is used to calculate this metric: 
 
This estimate gives us an idea of how successful the protocol is in delivering 
packets to the application layer. A high value of this ratio indicates that most of the 
packets are being delivered to the higher layers and is a good indicator of the protocol 
performance. Figures (5.3) and (5.4) show the packet delivery ratio of SWBAODV, 
SAODV, Ariadne and WBAODV routing protocols with different number of mobile 






































Figure (5.3): Packet delivery ratio versus number of nodes with 10 m/s 
We can observe that SWBAODV transmits and receives more data packet than 
SAODV and Ariadne. This is because SAODV and Ariadne path may broken easily, but 
SWBAODV will always choose the most stable path, the chance of link breakage for 
SWBAODV is lower than that for SAODV and Ariadne since SAODV and Ariadne 








































Figure (5.4): Packet delivery ratio versus mobility speeds with 50 nodes 
Also we can observe that there is a big difference in the packet delivery ratio 
between SWBAODV and the rest of routing protocols in figures (5.3) and (5.4). This  
because SWBAODV used many security schemes to monitor, detect, isolate 
misbehaving nodes and cope many dangerous routing attacks in MANET. Such 
schemes which didn't exist in SAODV, Ariadne and WBAODV routing protocols will 
prevent malicious nodes to drop control packets or tunnel them and that at the end will 
cause to transmit and receive more data packets. 
5.3.3  Number of Packets Drop 
The total number of packets dropped during routing. It also defined as the 
packets that are dropped in the network due to malicious drops, route failures, 
congestion, and wireless channel losses. This estimate gives us an idea of how 
successful the protocol is in delivering packets to the application layer. A low value of 
this ratio indicates that the most of the packets are being delivered to the higher layers 
and is a good indicator of the protocol performance.  
Figures (5.5) and (5.6) show the number of packets drop of SWBAODV, 
SAODV, Ariadne and WBAODV routing protocols with different number of mobile 
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nodes and mobility speeds, respectively. As shown in figures (5.5) and (5.6), the 
number of packets drop increased as the number of mobile nodes or the mobility speed 
increased. Because SWBAODV always chooses the most stable route for transmission 
that reduces the number of packets dropped, so the number of call dropping of 





































































Figure (5.6): Number of packets drop versus mobility speeds with 50 nodes 
We can also observe that there is a big difference in the number of packets drop  
between SWBAODV and the rest of routing protocols in figures (5.5) and (5.6). This  
because SWBAODV used many security schemes to monitor, detect, isolate  
 ٧٧
misbehaving nodes and cope many dangerous routing attacks in MANET. Such 
schemes which didn't exist in SAODV, Ariadne and WBAODV routing protocols will 
prevent malicious nodes to drop control packets or tunnel them and that at the end will 
cause to reduce the number of dropped data packets. Another reason that SWBAODV 
decreased the number of dropped packets is using the flooding attack prevention 
scheme which will prevent malicious nodes to flood the network of useless RREQ 
packets and that will lead to reduce the congestion over the links. 
5.3.4  Routing Packets Overhead 
It can be defined as the total number of routing packets transmitted during the 
simulation. For packets sent over multiple hops, each transmission of the packet at each 
hop counts as one transmission. Data packets aren't included in the calculation of this 
metric. This estimate gives us an idea of how successful the protocol can provide stable 
routing paths and reduces the links congestion. A low value of this measure indicates 
that more stability of routing paths and less congestion in the network which is 
considered as a good indicator of the protocol performance.  
Figures (5.7) and (5.8) show routing packets overhead of SWBAODV, SAODV, 
Ariadne and WBAODV routing protocols with different number of mobile nodes and 
mobility speeds, respectively. As shown in figures (5.7) and (5.8), the routing overhead 
increased as the number of mobile nodes or the mobility speed increased. Since the 
physical area remains the same, a small number of mobile hosts mean a lower host 
density. In general, the routing overhead of Ariadne and SAODV increased faster than 
the routing overhead of SWBAODV when the number of hosts increased. This is 
because Ariadne and SAODV just select the shortest path for routing. However, 
SWBAODV always selects the most stable route (the route with the maximum weight 
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value) for routing. Therefore, the overhead of SWBAODV is lower than that of Ariadne 









































































Figure (5.8): Routing packets overhead versus mobility speeds with 50 nodes 
Also in general, the routing overhead of Ariadne and SAODV increased faster 
than the routing overhead of SWBAODV when the roaming speed increased. This 
because the routing path is easier to be broken when the speed of the mobile hosts is 
faster. In addition, the number of rebroadcasts will increase. Therefore, the overhead is 
higher as a result. Although SWBAODV uses some special packets like Two-hop ACK, 
WREQ, WREP, ACREQ, ACREP and AC which are used as a part of the control 
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packet dropping prevention scheme to monitor, detect and isolate the misbehaving 
nodes along the route path and over the network, but the overhead is not an important 
issue for this kind of packets, since their number is low in comparison with the number 
of main routing packets. 
The routing overhead of SWBAODV is approximately similar to the routing 
overhead of WBAODV routing protocol. The small difference between them in routing 
overhead is due to that SWBAODV uses some special packets which didn't exist in 
WBAODV and this leads to increase the routing overhead in SWBAODV about that in 
WBAODV routing protocol.  
5.3.5  Average Power Consumption 
We can define the average consumed power as the following equation: 
 
Such that PCi is the power consumed by node i during the simulation. This estimate 
gives us an idea of how the protocol affect on the power available in the nodes' battery. 
A low value of this measure indicates that less processing and transmissions which is 
considered as a good indicator of the protocol performance. 
 Figures (5.9) and (5.10) show the average power consumption of SWBAODV, 
SAODV, Ariadne and WBAODV routing protocols with different number of mobile 
nodes and mobility speeds, respectively. As shown in figure (5.9) the average power 
consumption of SWBAODV increased faster than the average power consumption of 
SAODV and Ariadne when the number of hosts increased. This is because SWBAODV 
uses combination of security mechanisms to cope different types of attacks and also 
uses the weight-based routing strategy to select the stable path which in result there is a 
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large amount of processing at each node. On the other hand because SAODV and 
Ariadne always selects the shortest path and didn't use any of these security mechanisms 










































Figure (5.9): Average power consumption versus number of nodes with 10 m/s 
In figure (5.10) we can observe that the average power consumption of 
SWBAODV decreased faster than the average power consumption of SAODV and 
Ariadne when the roaming speed increased. This is mainly due to the increasing of 
packets lost when the mobility is raised. Because of the stability of SWBAODV these 
lost packets is lower than of that in SAODV and Ariadne, so SWBAODV consumes 
power lower than them in high mobility. In general the small difference in the power 
consumption between SAODV, Ariadne and SWBAODV in high mobility is due to the 
overhead which indicates that the cost of the control packets added by the latter 
(overhead) is minor. 
The average power consumption of WBAODV is lower than that of 
SWBAODV and this can be explained by that SWBAODV uses many security 
mechanisms to cope many routing attacks which consume the node's battery faster than 

































































6.1  Conclusion 
In this thesis we proposed a new secure routing protocol in MANET which we 
called Secure Weight-Based Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (SWBAODV) routing 
protocol. SWBAODV is an on-demand routing protocol, but the main difference 
between SWBAODV and other on demand routing protocols is that SWBAODV uses 
the weight-based routing strategy which selects a stable routing path by maximizing the 
weight among all the feasible paths. The route selection is based on the weight value of 
each feasible path. In a feasible path, the less weight value represents less reliability. It 
also represents higher mobility of each node in the path. SWBAODV always selects the 
most stable path for routing which it has the maximum weight value.  
We also added to SWBAODV many security mechanisms and primitives which 
cooperated well together to enhance its immunity against most common routing attacks 
in MANET. The results of security analysis of SWBAODV and six of secure routing 
protocols in MANET against these attacks show that all the six secure routing protocols 
in MANET success to prevent some attacks and failed in another, but SWBAODV 
success to prevent or mitigate all of them. Also SWBAODV success to satisfy all the 
standard security goals.  
We built SWBAODV and compared its performance with two of famous on-
demand ad hoc secure routing protocols (SAODV and Ariadne) and WBAODV routing 
protocol. These four routing protocols were evaluated through JiST/SWAN simulator. 
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We subjected these four routing protocols against extensive simulations with ad hoc 
network's performance metrics like average end-to-end delay, packet delivery ratio 
(throughput), number of packets drop, routing overhead and the average power 
consumption. These metrics was chosen due to they were well-known in showing the 
routing performance of the selected routing protocols. Experimental results show that 
the SWBAODV outperforms SAODV and Ariadne in throughput, the number of 
packets drop and routing overhead especially in the high mobility environment. 
Although SWBAODV increases the average end-to-end delay and the average power 
consumption, but this is the penalty of using the weight-based routing strategy and 
many combined security mechanisms to provide routing stability and coping many 
attacks which SAODV and Ariadne are vulnerable to them. 
 The  difference between SWBAODV, SAODV and Ariadne in delay and power 
consumption is still acceptable and get closer in high mobility environment due to the 
stability of SWBAODV which is not exist in SAODV and Ariadne. Because one of the 
main properties of MANET is high mobility, so we can say that SWBAODV has better 
performance than other secure on-demand routing protocols. 
6.2  Future Work and Recommendations 
Research in the area of ad hoc secure routing protocols is still actively done. Due 
to the time limitations and code availability the current work was only focused on 
evaluating SWBAODV with two secure routing protocols in MANET: SAODV and 
Ariadne with some selected performance metrics. The performance evaluation of 
SWBAODV with other ad hoc secure routing protocols which are discussed in this 
thesis work with some more performance metrics and studying the limitation of 
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